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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 The current federal death penalty statute provides the following 
relaxed evidentiary standard, which, inter alia, governs the method with 
which the facts that render a defendant eligible for the death penalty 
(i.e., aggravating factors) may be proven: 
The government may present any information relevant to an 
aggravating factor. . . .  Information is admissible regardless of its 
admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at 
criminal trials except that information may be excluded if its probative 
value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, 
confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.1 
Under the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 (hereinafter FDPA),2 
after a federal capital defendant has been convicted of a qualifying 
predicate offense (during the guilt-innocence phase of his or her trial), 
the government must still prove additional statutorily prescribed 
aggravating factors,3 beyond a reasonable doubt, to raise the level of the 
offense to one that exposes the defendant to the specter of the death 
penalty.  (The defendant is not eligible for the death penalty simply by 
virtue of his conviction on the predicate offense alone.)4  This is 
constitutionally significant because, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 
holding in Ring v. Arizona,5 aggravating factors function as additional 
elements necessary to constitute a capital crime, which, in essence, is 
tantamount to an entirely different offense.6   
The factfinding necessary to establish the existence of the 
aggravating factors occurs at a separate sentencing hearing, in an 
adversarial, trial-like setting, with the right to a jury, in what has been 
 
 1. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) (emphasis added). 
 2. Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3591-3598 (2000). 
 3. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (listing statutory aggravating factors under the FDPA).  See also 
Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983) (“Statutory aggravating circumstances play a 
constitutionally necessary function at the stage of legislative definition: they circumscribe the class 
of persons eligible for the death penalty.”). 
 4. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (2000) (“If no aggravating factor set forth in section 3592 is found to 
exist, the court shall impose a sentence other than death authorized by law.”).  See Donald M. 
Houser, Reconciling Ring v. Arizona with the Current Structure of the Federal Capital Murder 
Trial: The Case for Trifurcation, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 349, 353 (2007) (As Donald Houser 
observes, “[u]pon the conclusion of the guilt phase, the maximum punishment facing the defendant 
if he is found guilty is life in prison.”). 
 5. 536 U.S. 584 (2002). 
 6. See infra notes 123-144 and accompanying text. 
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termed the “eligibility determination” or phase (as in death eligibility).7  
But yet, notwithstanding the aforementioned application of Ring, this 
hearing occurs within a juridical framework where the nature and scope 
of the procedural protections afforded the defendant fundamentally 
differs from that of the trial proper.8  This disparity is especially glaring 
with regard to the inequality between the dramatically reduced right of 
confrontation the FDPA grants capital defendants during their 
sentencing hearing and the right of confrontation the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees criminal defendants in all stages of their “criminal 
prosecution.”9  To wit, in a federal capital trial, a jury may determine 
that a defendant is eligible to receive a death sentence (i.e., make 
findings of fact beyond a reasonable doubt) based on hearsay evidence 
that would not overcome a Confrontation Clause objection in even a 
misdemeanor trial.10 
Broadly speaking, the purpose of this article is to bring attention to 
this radical and irreconcilable disparity between the unequivocal Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation criminal defendants are afforded at 
trial,11 and the limited, qualified right of confrontation the FDPA grants 
federal capital defendants during death-eligibility determinations, which 
occur as part of the sentencing phase.12  It advances the argument that 
there is no tenable principled distinction on which this disparate 
procedural treatment may rest.  We will attempt to demonstrate that, as 
 
 7. See, e.g., United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119-21 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (for a 
good description of the factfinding that occurs during the eligibility phase); United States v. Jordan, 
357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 902 (E.D. Va. 2005) (“The evidentiary and deliberative process in the penalty 
of a capital case has two facets: eligibility and selection.”); United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 
2d 1043, 1099 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (describing the two-facet inquiry the sentencing phase of capital 
trials conducted pursuant to the FDPA). 
 8. As Professor John Douglas explains, 
Modern criminal prosecution spans two worlds: first a trial, then a sentencing. In capital 
cases, we know these two worlds as the “guilt” phase and the “penalty” phase . . . . Trial 
is an adversarial process, conducted under rules set out in a single sentence of the Sixth 
Amendment . . . . At best, a defendant’s “sentencing rights” are a faint shadow of his 
“trial rights.”  This division of criminal cases into two distinct worlds with different 
rights holds true even in capital cases . . . . 
John G. Douglas, Confronting Death: Sixth Amendment Rights at Capital Sentencing, 105 COLUM. 
L. REV. 1967, 1967-69 (2005).  See Alexander Bunin, When Trial and Punishment Intersect: New 
Defects in the Death Penalty, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 233, 235 (2004)  (observing that “in most 
death penalty jurisdictions, a capital defendant is prosecuted for some elements of capital murder 
without the trial protections available even to a person charged with a simple misdemeanor”). 
 9. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), with Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); U.S. 
CONST.  amend. VI. 
 10. See infra notes 104-112 and accompanying text. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
 12. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).  See infra notes 99-109 and accompanying text. 
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written, the statutory provision that governs the admission of evidence at 
capital sentencings—18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)13—is unconstitutional on its 
face as it applies to death eligibility determinations—and cannot be 
salvaged by judicial construction.   
Specifically, we will argue that the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Ring,14 read in conjunction with the Court’s holding in Crawford,15 
necessarily renders 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) of the FDPA unconstitutional, 
because it violates the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment.16  
Furthermore, notwithstanding judicial efforts to ameliorate this 
constitutional quandary, application of the cardinal cannons of statutory 
construction inexorably leads to the conclusion that the doctrine of 
constitutional avoidance may not be invoked to rescue the statute.  
Indeed, it is our position that judicial attempts to salvage the 
constitutionality of that provision through trifurcating federal capital 
trials17—i.e., subdividing the sentencing proceedings of a federal capital 
trial into an eligibility phase (in which the defendant is afforded a Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation) and a separate sentence-selection 
phase—likewise run afoul of the Constitution.  That being said, we 
submit that, consistent with the Constitution, the only viable way in 
which the aforementioned procedural deficiencies may be corrected is 
legislatively mandated trifurcation. 
In reaching our conclusion, this article will explore, inter alia, the 
extensions of our constitutionally grounded right of confrontation; that 
is, “[i]n all criminal prosecutions” the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth 
Amendment unequivocally grants the accused the right “to be 
confronted with the witnesses against him.”18  Per that language, the 
accused is guaranteed the right of confrontation during every stage of his 
or her criminal prosecution,19 which, at least as a general proposition, 
affords the accused two principle procedural rights that are crucial to our 
 
 13. For the relevant statutory text, see supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 14. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).  See infra notes 122-127 and accompanying text. 
 15. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 16. See id. at 68. 
 17. See infra notes 207-216 and accompanying text. 
 18. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  See, e.g. United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47 (1st Cir. 
2005) (explaining that “[t]he Confrontation Clause provides defendants with the right to confront 
adverse witnesses ‘[i]n criminal prosecutions.’”) (citing U.S. CONST. amend. VI)). 
 19. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. See also FRANCIS H. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO 
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 35 
(University of Kansas Press 1951) (“The Sixth Amendment, as proposed by Congress and ratified 
by the states, enumerated certain features of procedure to which an accused should be entitled ‘in all 
criminal prosecutions.’”). 
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position: the right to literally confront adverse witnesses at trial, face-to-
face, and the right to cross-examine those witnesses.20   
Furthermore, at least insofar as the government may seek to adduce 
the testimonial statements of an out-of-court declarant (i.e., testimonial 
hearsay21), if the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation applies, then 
the additional procedural strictures mandated by Supreme Court’s 
holding in Crawford v. Washington also apply, providing criminal 
defendants with greatly enhanced procedural protections.22  Those 
strictures place a per se bar on the admission of uncross-examined, 
testimonial hearsay—presently admissible under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)—
thereby precluding the admission of such statements save for when the 
government can establish not only that the declarant is unavailable but 
also that the defendant previously had an opportunity to cross-examine 
her.23  Additionally, and quite importantly, Crawford’s holding 
substantially does away with the idea of a judge acting as a gatekeeper in 
determining the reliability of out-of-court statements for purposes of 
admissibility.  In fact, Crawford’s holding, in large measure, rests on the 
premise that “[a]dmitting [testimonial hearsay] statements deemed 
reliable by a judge is fundamentally at odds with the [Sixth Amendment] 
right of confrontation.”24  Without the support of the judge-as-
constitutional-gatekeeper rationale, often invoked to uphold the 
constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), that provision falls further into 
constitutional oblivion. 
We are not saying, as a normative matter, that the Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation should apply to capital sentencing 
proceedings for public policy or moral reasons, nor are we merely 
sketching a prescriptive solution to a practical problem (e.g., how to best 
ensure that evidence is reliable or accurate).  Likewise, this article does 
 
 20. Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) (plurality opinion).  See, e.g., Kirby v. 
United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) (“A fact which can be primarily established only by witnesses 
cannot be proved against an accused . . . except by witnesses who confront him at the trial, upon 
whom he can look while being tried, whom he is entitled to cross-examine . . . .”). 
 21. For a good definition of testimonial hearsay, see Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-52.  See also 
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006) (further discussing and elaborating on the concept).  See 
generally FED. R. EVID. 801 (c) (Defining “hearsay” as “a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted.”). 
 22. See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36. 
 23. See id. at 68-69.  See also Rondeau, 430 F.3d at 47 (“In Crawford, the Supreme Court 
held that, in a criminal prosecution, the Sixth Amendment forbids the introduction of an out-of-
court testimonial statement unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant has previously had 
an opportunity to cross-examine her.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
 24. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61. 
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not seek to address the question whether the Constitution requires that 
the Federal Rules of Evidence apply to the eligibility phase of federal 
capital trials, nor does it discuss the scope of a capital defendant’s due 
process rights (or, for that matter, other Sixth Amendment rights) at 
sentencing.  We take no position on the morality of capital punishment 
generally.  Furthermore, if, as we argue, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), runs afoul 
of the Confrontation Clause on its face, the question of its severability 
from the remainder of the FDPA is beyond the scope of this article.25   
It is worth noting that other factors militate toward our conclusion 
that—at a minimum—the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation 
applies to the separate eligibility decision required by not only the FDPA 
but also the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence:26 the 
history of the right of confrontation and the Framers’ intent to enshrine it 
in the Bill of Rights;27 the fact that the Court has held other Sixth 
Amendment rights—also limited in scope by the phrase “[i]n all criminal 
prosecutions”28—applicable at sentencing (capital or otherwise),29 
despite the absence of a principled ground on which a disparity in scope 
could rest;30 our history of conducting unitary capital trials in which the 
sentencing decision was, in effect, merged with and collapsed into the 
determination of guilt, where a capital defendant was thereby afforded 
full trial rights throughout;31 and the Supreme Court’s frequent emphasis 
 
 25. See generally Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 685 (1987); United States v. 
Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 585 (1968). 
 26. See John G. Douglas, supra note 8, at 1994-95; Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 
275-76 (1998); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 27. See infra notes 163-174 and accompanying text. 
 28. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 29. See infra note 141. 
 30. See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
 31. See Douglas, supra note 8, at 1967 (discussing the “history of unified trials in the era of 
the Framers, where guilt and death were determined simultaneously by a single jury verdict”).  
While the Framers may have been willing to allow for the exercise of judicial discretion in 
sentencing decisions that did not involve the possibility of a death sentence, which is consistent with 
the common-law tradition for adjudicating misdemeanors, the available evidence strongly suggests 
that the Framers felt it necessary to accord capital crimes differing treatment: “To them, the 
question of guilt for a capital crime and the question of death remained inseparable.  And they left 
both questions to juries in the context of a trial featuring full adversarial rights.”  Id. at 2017-18 
(emphasis added).  As Professor John Langbein observes, as a practical matter, in English capital 
trials, the sentencing decision—i.e., whether the defendant would live or die—was essentially 
“[structur[ed] . . . as an incident of the trial . . . .”  JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY 
CRIMINAL TRIAL 59 (Oxford University Press 2003).  The legal landscape was substantially similar 
in colonial America.  See United States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 407 (8th Cir. 1992) (Arnold, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[T]he Framers of the Bill of Rights knew nothing of 
sentencing proceedings separate from the trial itself.”).  See also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 
6
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on the need for enhanced reliability in capital sentencing proceedings.32  
But detailed consideration of those additional arguments will not be 
discussed in this article.  Rather, we focus on the narrowly defined issue 
presented: the constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)’s relaxed 
evidentiary standard. 
In Part I, we will attempt to frame the problem we believe needs to 
be addressed: the manner in which the relaxed evidentiary standard 18 
U.S.C. § 3593(c) prescribes deprives capital defendants of the full 
panoply of their Sixth Amendment confrontation rights during the 
litigation of facts that are the functional equivalent of elements of federal 
capital murder, inter alia, by allowing the trial judge to admit 
testimonial hearsay at his or her discretion.33  In Part II, we will explore 
the Supreme Court’s recent forays into what we shall call, for the 
purpose of this article, “functional equivalence jurisprudence,” to 
illustrate the constitutional significance of equating statutorily prescribed 
aggravating factors with elements of an offense, and its resonation with 
some federal district courts.34  In Part III, we will advance an alternative 
argument for applying the right of confrontation to the eligibility 
determination based on a careful reading of the text of the Sixth 
Amendment.35  In Part IV, we will sketch the history of the Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation and explore the manner in which the 
Court’s holding in Crawford marked a sea change in its Sixth 
Amendment jurisprudence.36  In Part V, we will turn to Crawford’s 
effect on 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).37  In Part VI, we will explore the recent 
phenomenon of judicially imposed trifurcation in an effort to address the 
FDPA’s constitutional shortcomings, and we will argue that that 
practice, whether by motion or sua sponte, is likewise unconstitutional.38  
Finally, in Part VII, we will propose a pragmatic solution to this 
constitutional quandary: legislatively mandated trifurcation.39 
 
U.S. 280, 289 (1976) (plurality opinion).  See generally HUGO ADAM BEDAU, THE DEATH PENALTY 
IN AMERICA 6-11 (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed. 1982) (1964). 
 32. See infra note 203 and accompanying text. 
 33. See infra notes 40-113 and accompanying text. 
 34. See infra notes 114-149 and accompanying text. 
 35. See infra notes 150-162 and accompanying text. 
 36. See infra notes 163-191 and accompanying text. 
 37. See infra notes 192-206 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra notes 207-245 and accompanying text. 
 39. See infra notes 246-253 and accompanying text. 
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II. FRAMING THE PROBLEM 
A. United States v. Fields 
In 2007, the Fifth Circuit, in essence, recognized the 
aforementioned incongruity in United States v. Fields.40  The relevant 
facts before the Fields court can be summarized as follows:  In the guilt-
innocence phase of his trial, a jury had convicted Sherman Fields of a 
potentially capital offense; following the verdict, the government sought 
to establish that Fields should be put to death.41  As part of its efforts at 
sentencing,42 the government, inter alia, attempted to introduce the 
following out-of-court statements for the purpose of proving that Fields 
had, in fact, committed prior violent crimes:  
(1) statements made about him by his mother and juvenile probation 
officers in various records introduced into evidence by a Juvenile 
Probation Department official; (2) statements made about him by 
corrections officers in prison records introduced into evidence by state 
prison officials; (3) statements made by officers in police reports 
introduced into evidence by someone other than the officer who had 
made the report; (4) a detective’s description, based on the 
investigating officer’s report, of the drive-by shooting that led to 
Fields’s 1992 conviction of attempted murder; and (5) statements made 
by witnesses to police officers while the officers were investigating 
various past crimes in which Fields may have been involved but for 
which he was never charged (the statements being described in the 
officers’ testimony).43 
Fields’s counsel objected on Confrontation Clause grounds; 
however, the trial court overruled the objection and admitted the 
aforementioned statements.44  As a result, those statements were 
admitted to prove the truth of the matters asserted, even though the 
declarants never testified, and the veracity of their statements was thus 
never tested through cross-examination.  Based, at least in part, on that 
uncross-examined hearsay evidence, the jury recommended that Fields 
 
 40. 483 F.3d 313, 325 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1065, 169 L.Ed.2d 814 (2008). 
 41. See id. at 324-26. 
 42. As the Fields court noted, the sentencing phase of Fields’s trial was conducted as “a 
typical one-part sentencing proceeding”; in other words, “[t]he court did not hold separate hearings 
on death eligibility and [sentence] selection, as some courts have recently done in ‘trifurcated’ 
capital trials,” which are discussed further infra.  Id. at 324, n.4.  See infra notes 79-81 and 
accompanying text. 
 43. Fields, 483 F.3d at 324-25. 
 44. Id. at 324. 
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receive a death sentence; the court agreed and sentenced Fields to 
death.45 
The principal issue before the Fields court was whether, in light of 
the Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford v. Washington,46 the 
admission of potentially testimonial hearsay at Fields’s capital 
sentencing proceeding impermissibly impinged upon his Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation.47  Over a vigorous dissent, the 
majority in Fields concluded, inter alia, that “in capital cases . . . the 
Confrontation Clause does not operate to bar the admission of testimony 
relevant only to a capital sentencing authority’s selection decision.”48  
Relying heavily on Williams v. New York49 and its progeny50—all of 
which, at least ostensibly, were decided under the rubric of due 
process—the Fields court reasoned that merely because “the 
Confrontation Clause is inapplicable to the presentation of testimony 
relevant only to the sentencing authority’s [sentence-]selection 
decision . . . [it] does not doom defendants to being sentenced to death 
on the basis of unreliable hearsay evidence.”51   
 
 45. Id. 
 46. 541 U.S. 36.  See infra notes 180-187 and accompanying text. 
 47. See Fields, 483 F.3d at 324. 
 48. See id. at 326 (emphasis added). 
 49. 337 U.S. 241, 252 (1949) (holding that that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment did not “render[] a [death] sentence void merely because a judge [considered] 
additional out-of-court information” in deciding on the appropriate sentence).  See also United 
States v. Wise, 976 F.2d 393, 408 (8th Cir. 1992) (Arnold, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (“Williams . . . is not a Confrontation Clause case at all.  It is a due-process case from a state 
court . . . . “).  See generally Penny White, “He Said,” “She Said”, and Issues of Life and Death: 
The Right To Confrontation At Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 19 REGENT U. L. REV. 387, 402, 
406 (2007) (“The authority relied upon most frequently by state and federal courts to reject the 
application of the [Sixth Amendment] right of confrontation at capital sentencing is the Supreme 
Court’s 1949 decision in Williams v. New York.”).  As Professor Douglas laments, “Williams . . . 
placed capital sentencing outside the world of ‘trial’ procedure.  The result has been a sentencing 
world with virtually no constitutional limits on hearsay, and with no constitutional assurance that a 
defendant facing death will be equipped with the basic tools of the adversarial process.”  Douglas, 
supra note 8, at 1983. 
 50. See Fields, 483 F.3d at 326-332.  When the Supreme Court revisited the issue of capital 
defendants’ confrontation rights at sentencing in Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349 (1977) (plurality 
opinion), Justice Stevens, writing for the plurality, opined: “[I]t is now clear that the sentencing 
process, as well as the trial itself, must satisfy the requirements of the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 
358.  However, the Gardner Court refused to overrule Williams, instead electing to distinguish it.  
See id. at 356.  Cf. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1967) (holding that where a 
sentencing statute requires a judge to make factual determinations that are “not an ingredient of the 
offense charged” at sentencing, “[d]ue process . . . requires that [the defendant] . . . be confronted 
with witnesses against him, [and] have the right to cross-examine . . . .”); United States v. Mills, 446 
F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (noting that “Specht makes clear that some factfinding will 
give rise to confrontation rights”). 
 51. Fields, 483 F.3d at 337 (emphasis added). 
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The Fields court posited that notwithstanding that the 
Confrontation Clause does not apply to capital sentencing proceedings, 
there are, nonetheless, some “constitutional limitations on the use of 
hearsay at such proceedings”—e.g., “[d]ue process requires that some 
minimal indicia of reliability accompany a hearsay statement.”52  But 
with regard to the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, the court 
opined:  “[N]o other Sixth Amendment right has been applied (vel non) 
differently at capital sentencing from how it is applied at noncapital 
sentencing, there is little reason to establish divergent rules with regard 
to the confrontation right when the sentencing authority is selecting a 
sentence from within an authorized range.”53 
In other words, because the challenged hearsay was presumably 
only relevant to the sentencing authority’s normative, morality-based 
decision of whether to impose a death sentence on a defendant—whose 
eligibility to receive that sentence had already been established (i.e., a 
death sentence was within the authorized range of penalties the jury 
could impose)—that defendant did not have a Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation.  By negative implication, then, the court’s opinion can be 
read to mean that if the challenged hearsay had been used to prove the 
underlying facts necessary to expose the defendant to the possibility of a 
death sentence—death eligibility—then the result may have been 
different. 
Critical to the majority’s reasoning was the notion that the 
challenged hearsay statements had not been presented to prove the 
statutory aggravating factors that the government had alleged—proof of 
which is a condition precedent to triggering a defendant’s death-
eligibility under the FDPA54—but rather were only germane to the 
government’s effort to establish additional, nonstatutory aggravating 
factors.55  Therefore, according to the Fields majority, that evidence was 
only relevant to the jury’s sentence-selection decision.56  But in 
 
 52. Id. at 337-38 (quoting United States v. Petty, 982 F.2d 1365, 1369 (9th Cir. 1993)).  Cf. 
United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (holding that a defendant cannot constitutionally 
be sentenced on the basis of “misinformation of constitutional magnitude”). 
 53. Fields, 483 F.3d at 332. 
 54. See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text. 
 55. See Fields, 483 F.3d at 325 (“None of the challenged statements was presented as part of 
the government’s effort to establish the statutory aggravating factors that trigger death-eligibility 
under the [FDPA].”). 
 56. The Fields court opined: 
The establishment of nonstatutory aggravating factors is neither necessary nor sufficient 
to authorize imposition of the death penalty.  Nonstatutory aggravating factors may be 
considered by the jury in selecting an appropriate sentence once a defendant is found 
eligible for the death penalty, but they are not, and cannot be, used to determine that 
10
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concluding that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to the sentence-
selection stage of federal capital sentencing proceedings, the Fields court 
recognized “a constitutionally significant distinction between a trial of 
the elements of an offense and the selection of an appropriate penalty 
from an available range once guilt has been determined . . . .”57  
Concordant with that notion, in a footnote, the majority unambiguously 
narrowed the scope of its holding:  “[W]e decline to decide the 
applicability of the Confrontation Clause to the presentation of evidence 
at sentencing that is relevant only to death eligibility or to both eligibility 
and selection.”58 
Although the Fields court explicitly declined to consider whether 
the Confrontation Clause applies to the eligibility phase of federal 
capital sentencing proceedings, in essence, the court intimated that it 
would.59  This article addresses the question the Fields court left open: 
does the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation per Crawford apply to 
the eligibility determination in federal capital sentencing proceedings?  
As discussed infra, in light of recent Supreme Court precedent, we 
submit that it does.  
 
eligibility . . . . 
Id.  But cf. United States v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1056 (N.D. Iowa 2005)) (citing United 
States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1109-10 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (recognizing that, as a practical 
matter, “if the jury is permitted to hear information on all of the factors [i.e., hear information 
relevant to the defendant’s death eligibility (statutory aggravating factors) and evidence relevant to 
the sentence-selection decision (e.g., non-statutory aggravating factors)] in one proceeding, the jury 
is reasonably likely to be misled into believing that all information is pertinent to the determination 
of all factors and the balance of factors”) (emphasis in original).  See also Simmons v. South 
Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 170-71 (1993). 
 57. Fields, 483 F.3d at 333.  Recognizing the differences between those two aspects of the 
capital decision-making process, the Supreme Court has accorded “differing constitutional 
treatment” to the eligibility and sentence-selection determinations: 
It is in regard to the eligibility phase that [the Supreme Court] ha[s] stressed the need for 
channeling and limiting the jury’s discretion to ensure that the death penalty is a[n] 
appropriate punishment and therefore not arbitrary or capricious in its imposition.  In 
contrast, in the selection phase, [the Court] ha[s] emphasized the need for a broad 
inquiry into all relevant mitigating evidence to allow an individualized determination. 
Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 275-76 (1998) (Citing Tuilaepa v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 
973 (1994) (plurality opinion)).  See generally LINDA E. CARTER, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL 
PUNISHMENT LAW 106, 117 (LexisNexis 2004) (discussing the constitutional distinction between 
the eligibility and sentence-selection determinations). 
 58. Fields, 483 F.3d at 326 n.7.  In footnote 18, the Fields court reiterated that proposition:  
“Fields’s Confrontation Clause challenge relates only to evidence that the government introduced 
relevant to the jury’s ultimate selection decision. The applicability of the Confrontation Clause to 
the establishment of eligibility-triggering factors is therefore not a question squarely presented by 
this case, and we decline to resolve it definitively.”  Id. at 331, n.18. 
 59. See supra notes 46-57 and accompanying text. 
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That conclusion, in turn, ineluctably leads to a follow-up question: 
Is the disparity in scope between the procedural protections guaranteed a 
criminal defendant by the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation and 
the—drastically reduced—procedural protections the FDPA affords 
capital defendants at sentencing reconcilable?  Or, put differently, does 
the radical incongruity between the procedural rights enumerated in the 
Confrontation Clause, as defined by Crawford, and the procedural rights 
afforded capital defendants pursuant to the sentencing procedure 
prescribed by the FDPA render that statute’s procedural framework 
facially unconstitutional?  In our view, because the procedures 
delineated by 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) eviscerate the procedural safeguards 
the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation guarantees defendants by 
ceding essentially unfettered discretion to the trial judge to admit 
testimonial hearsay while the functional equivalent of elements of a 
capital crime are still being litigated,60 the answer is unequivocally yes.61 
B. Previous Challenges to the Constitutionality of the FDPA  
United States v. Fields was not the first case in which the issue of 
whether the admission of hearsay during the sentencing phase of capital 
trials pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) impermissibly impinged on the 
defendant’s constitutional rights has been litigated.62  For that matter, the 
constitutionality of the sentencing procedure the FDPA prescribes has 
been challenged on numerous occasions.63  Thus far, the relaxed 
evidentiary standard 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) prescribes has ultimately 
survived repeated constitutional challenges.64  However, recent 
 
 60. As Alexander Bunin observes, “[i]n a capital case, facts that make a defendant eligible for 
the death penalty are elements of the crime.”  Bunin, supra note 8, 235. That being said, because the 
FDPA requires that the eligibility determination takes place in the context of sentencing, in effect, 
“some elements of capital murder are denied the procedural protections of a trial.” Id. at 233. 
 61. But see United States v. Troya, No. 06-80171-Cr, 2008 WL 4327004, at *5 (S.D. Fla. 
2008) (“A facial challenge to a federal statute is difficult to mount. To succeed on a facial challenge 
to the FDPA, [a] Defendant must establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the 
FDPA would be valid.”) (citations omitted). See generally United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 
745 (1987). 
 62. See, e.g., United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135 (2d Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 125 S.Ct. 369, 
543 U.S. 946, 160 L.Ed.2d 259, on remand, 372 F. Supp. 2d 753 (rejecting a post-Ring, pre-
Crawford facial challenge to the constitutionality of the FDPA); United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 
2d 1115 (C.D. Cal. 2006); Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 63. See Linda E. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish For: The Constitutionality of the 
Federal Death Penalty Act After Ring v. Arizona, 43 BRANDEIS L.J. 79, 79-80 (2004) (noting the 
prevalence of litigation challenging the constitutionality of the FDPA’s relaxed evidentiary standard 
at sentencing).  See infra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 64. See, e.g., Fell, 360 F.3d at 145-46; United States v. Battle, 264 F. Supp. 2d 1088 (N.D. 
Ga. 2003) (holding, inter alia, that the FDPA’s relaxed evidentiary standard used in the sentencing 
12
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jurisprudential developments (i.e., Crawford) have, at minimum, cast 
doubt on the continued viability of that provision.65  Indeed, even prior 
to Crawford, the evolving jurisprudential landscape led at least one 
federal district court to conclude that the provision was facially 
unconstitutional.66 
The Supreme Court has never directly addressed the applicability of 
the Confrontation Clause to capital sentencing proceedings.67  
Additionally, the Supreme Court’s holding in Crawford, the most recent 
seminal right-of-confrontation case, did nothing to clear up this 
ambiguity, declining to address the scope of the Confrontation Clause.68  
Consequently, there is a significant divergence of authority over the 
applicability of the Confrontation Clause to capital sentencing 
proceedings.69  To date, the Supreme Court has denied certiorari in 
 
phase of a capital trial did not violate the Confrontation Clause); United States v. Cooper, 91 F. 
Supp.2d 90, 98 (D.C. 2000); United States v. Frank, 8 F. Supp. 2d 253, 267-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); 
United States v. Nguyen, 928 F. Supp. 1525, 1546-47 (D. Kan. 1996); United States v. McVeigh, 
944 F.Supp. 1478, 1487 (D. Colo. 1996); United States v. Davis, No. CR.A.01-282, 2003 WL 
1837701, at *11 (E.D. La. 2003); United States v. Haynes, 269 F. Supp. 2d 970, 983-87 (W.D. 
Tenn. 2003); United States v. Regan, 221 F. Supp. 2d 672, 681-83 (E.D. Va. 2002); United States v. 
Minerd, 176 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435-436 (W.D. Pa. 2001); United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 
1043, 1105 (N.D. Iowa 2005); United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 141-46 (N.D.N.Y. 
2002); United States v. Mikos, No 02 CR 137-1, 2003 WL 22110948, at *8 (N.D. Ill. 2003).  See 
also United States v. Green, No. 5:06CR-19-R, 2008 WL 4000868, at *11 (W.D. Ky. 2008) 
(observing an “overwhelming consensus among the federal courts that the relaxed evidentiary 
standard in § 3593(c) is not unconstitutional” and listing cases). 
 65. See infra notes 163-188 and accompanying text. 
 66. See United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 474 (D. Vt. 2002), vacated by 360 F.3d 
135 (2d Cir. 2004).  Accord United States v. Quinones, 196 F. Supp. 2d 416 (S.D.N.Y. 2002); 
United States v. Quinones, 205 F. Supp. 2d 256 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d, 313 F.3d 49 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 67. See United States v. Kikimura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1103 n.19 (3rd Cir. 1990) (recognizing that 
the Supreme Court has yet to explicitly decide whether the Confrontation Clause applies at 
sentencing); Maynard v. Dixon, 943 F.2d 407, 414 n.5 (4th Cir. 1991) (same); Proffitt v. Wainright, 
685 F.2d 1227, 1253 (11th Cir. 1982) (same); see also United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 324 
(4th Cir. 2003) (“It is far from clear that the Confrontation Clause applies to a capital sentencing 
proceeding.”); United States v. Gray, 362 F. Supp. 2d 714, 725 (S.D. WV. 2005) (“The Supreme 
Court . . . has never decided whether sentencings are “criminal prosecutions” for Sixth Amendment 
purposes.”). 
 68. See United States v. Katzopoulos, 437 F.3d 569, 574 (6th Cir. 2006) (“An issue 
unaddressed by Crawford is whether the Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses applies . . . at 
sentencing.”); United States v. Chau, 426 F.3d 1318, 1323 (11th Cir. 2005) (“[T]here is no 
precedent . . . from the Supreme Court establishing that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the 
admission of hearsay evidence at sentencing proceedings”). 
 69. Compare Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 398 (7th Cir.2002) (Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation “applies through the finding of guilt, but not to sentencing, even when that sentence is 
the death penalty”); State v. McGill, 140 P.3d 930, 940-42 (Ariz. 2006) (Crawford applies to 
eligibility but not penalty phase of capital trial); State v. Stephenson, 195 S.W.3d 574, 590-91 
(Tenn. 2006) (same), with Rodgers v. State, 948 So.2d 655, 663 (Fla. 2006) (holding that “a 
defendant’s rights under the Confrontation Clause apply to the guilt phase, the penalty phase, and 
13
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United States v. Fell (upholding the constitutionality of the FDPA post-
Ring, pre-Crawford),70 and, likewise, in United States v. Fields.71  But it 
has never had occasion to directly confront the issue we raise in this 
article: whether, when read in conjunction with one another, the holdings 
in Crawford and Ring require the conclusion that the Confrontation 
Clause applies to the eligibility phase of capital trials conducted per 18 
U.S.C. § 3593(c). 
Prior to delving into the support for the aforementioned conclusion, 
let us begin with a descriptive overview of the FDPA.  Interestingly, its 
foundational premise, followed by its procedural guidelines, will prove 
to be relevant in evaluating the application of principles drawn from 
Crawford, Ring, and, a necessary precursor to Ring, Apprendi v. New 
Jersey.72 
C. The FDPA: Design and Scope 
Signed into law by President Clinton in 1994, the FDPA is part of 
an omnibus crime bill, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement 
Act of 1994,73 which was enacted by Congress to not only provide for an 
increased number of federal capital offenses but also expand the scope 
of the federal death penalty system.74  Interestingly, while the FDPA 
dramatically expanded the number of federal capital crimes, it did not 
create entirely new crimes but rather made numerous preexisting crimes 
potentially capital offenses.75  It can thus be described as “a sentencing 
 
sentencing,” and that Crawford applies to the penalty phase of a capital trial), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 
59, 169 L.Ed.2d 50 (2007); Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 880-81 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), cert. 
denied, 126 S.Ct. 2982 (2006); State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 603 S.E.2d 93, 115-16 (N.C. 2004) 
(holding that, in light of Crawford, the introduction of testimonial hearsay at the sentencing phase of 
a capital trial violated the Confrontation Clause); Proffitt, 685 F.2d at 1254-55 (11th Cir. 1982) 
(recognizing defendants’ right to cross-examination in the sentencing phase of a capital trial); 
Rodriguez v. State, 753 So.2d 29, 43 (Fla. 2000) (stating that the Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation applies to all three phases of a capital trial). 
 70. See supra note 62. 
 71. See supra note 40. 
 72. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 73. RANDALL COYNE & LYN ENTZEROTH, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
871 (Carolina Academic Press, 2nd ed. 2001). 
 74. Joshua Herman, Death Denies Due Process: Evaluating Due Process Challenges to the 
Federal Death Penalty Act, 53 DEPAUL L. REV. 1777, 1799-1800 (2004).  See COYNE, supra note 
73, at 871 (explaining that “this expansion was accomplished by (1) creating new federal crimes 
which are punishable by death; (2) adding death as a sentencing option to recently-created federal 
offenses; and (3) resurrecting dormant, pre-Furman death penalty statutes by purporting to cure 
their constitutional deficiencies”). 
 75. As Joshua Herman explains: 
The FDPA expanded the death penalty to sixty different crimes, but this does not mean 
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statute under which certain enumerated federal crimes are eligible for 
capital punishment.”76   
 The procedures delineated by the FDPA will apply to “any 
[federal] offense for which a sentence of death is provided.”77  18 U.S.C. 
§ 3593(b) of the FDPA, which outlines the basic procedures governing 
federal capital trials, requires that prior to a determination of the 
appropriate sentence the jury first adjudicate the defendant’s guilt.78  
Pursuant to the FDPA, capital trials are thus bifurcated into two separate 
and distinct phases: a guilt-innocence phase, in which “the jury 
determines whether the defendant is guilty of the underlying capital 
offense,” and the sentencing (or penalty) phase.79  At the conclusion of 
the guilt-innocence phase of federal capital trials, the defendant is not 
yet subject to the death penalty—the maximum sentence that may be 
imposed at that juncture is life in prison.80  It is at this point—after the 
defendant has been convicted of the predicate offense during the guilt-
innocence phase of his or her trial—that the sentencing (penalty) phase 
commences.81 
D. Outlining the FDPA’s Penalty Phase 
There are two distinct components of the penalty phase: a 
determination of whether the defendant is eligible, under the FDPA, to 
receive a death sentence (i.e., “whether the range of possible 
punishments includes death”) and, if so, a determination of whether the 
 
that the FDPA created sixty crimes.  One way to consider the effect the FDPA has on 
existing substantive criminal law is that it “merely applies its procedural provisions to 
these crimes, making them death eligible.” For example, the FDPA transformed 
carjacking into a capital crime by adding the death penalty as the maximum punishment 
and not by changing the elements of carjacking. 
Herman, supra note 74, at 1800-01. 
 76. Bunin, supra note 8, at 268; see 18 U.S.C. § 3592 (2000) (listing the aggravating factors 
to be considered in determining whether a defendant is eligible for the death penalty as well as 
potential countervailing mitigating factors weighing against the conclusion that the defendant 
should be sentenced to death). 
 77. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3591(a)(2).  It should be noted that other federal statutes that authorize the 
imposition of capital punishment, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1998), prescribe a procedural framework 
that is identical to that supplied by the FDPA.  See United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 
894 n.6 (E.D. Va. 2005). 
 78. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b). 
 79. Houser, supra note 4, at 352-53. 
 80. Id. at 352.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b). 
 81. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b) (prescribing a separate sentencing hearing to determine the 
appropriate punishment for defendants who are convicted of or plead guilty to the predicate capital 
offense). 
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imposition of a death sentence is appropriate.82  The FDPA prescribes 
the procedures that govern the entire penalty phase of all federal capital 
trials,83 i.e., both the eligibility determination and sentence-selection 
components of federal capital sentencing hearings.   
The FDPA contemplates a unitary sentencing proceeding, 
consolidating the eligibility determination and sentence-selection 
determination into a single hearing.84  The same procedural framework 
applies to both determinations.85  However, the nature of these two 
aspects of the capital decision-making process—i.e., the determination 
of whether a defendant who has been convicted of the underlying 
offense is even eligible to receive a death sentence and, if so, the 
selection of the appropriate sentence—is substantially different.86  The 
eligibility determination involves a fact-based legal determination 
(whether, based on the facts of this case, this defendant may be 
sentenced to death under this statute).  The sentence-selection decision, 
on the other hand, entails a moral, normative assessment of the 
defendant’s culpability (whether this defendant should receive—that is, 
deserves—a death sentence).  Notwithstanding the fundamental 
differences between the two inquiries, given that the FDPA prescribes a 
unitary sentencing proceeding that subsumes within it both 
determinations, evidence relevant to each facet of the penalty phase is 
received simultaneously.87 
 
 82. Houser, supra note 4, at 353.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) (discussing the manner in 
which a sentencing hearing is conducted); supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 83.  See United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2006); 18 U.S.C. § 
3593. 
 84.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b) (“the judge . . . shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing 
to determine the punishment to be imposed . . . .”) (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) 
(“[a]t the sentencing hearing”) (emphasis added).  See United States v. Concepcion Sablan, 555 F. 
Supp. 2d 1205, 1222 (D. Colo 2007) (noting that the statute neither authorizes nor even mentions a 
bifurcated sentencing proceeding); Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1131 n.16 (noting that “dividing the 
penalty phase [is] a procedure not foreseen by the FDPA”).  But cf. United States v. Bodkins, No. 
CRIM.A.4:04CR70083, 2005 WL 1118158, *7 (W.D. Va. 2005) (“A bifurcated process is not 
required by 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) . . . .  In fact, the statute contemplates the possibility of a unitary 
proceeding . . . .  Nevertheless, neither does the statute forbid a bifurcated proceeding.”). 
 85. See generally Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1119-21. 
 86. See Buchanan, 522 U.S. at 275 (“In the eligibility phase, the jury narrows the class of 
defendants eligible for the death penalty . . . . In the selection phase, the jury determines whether to 
impose a death sentence on an eligible defendant.”).  See also United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 
240 (5th Cir. 1998), aff’d, 527 U.S. 373 (1999) (“After finding the existence of at least one statutory 
aggravating factor [under the FDPA], the jury may consider the existence of nonstatutory 
aggravating factors for which notice has been given by the government”). 
 87. See, e.g., Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1119-20; see 18 U.S.C. § 3593.  This fact is relevant to 
the issues raised by this article because it plays significantly into the remedy we will propose, 
discussed infra. 
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E. The Eligibility Determination and its Statutory Factors 
The threshold question a jury must answer during the sentencing 
phase of a federal capital trial is whether the defendant, after being 
convicted of the predicate capital offense, meets the statutory criteria to 
make him or her eligible for capital punishment—the eligibility stage of 
the sentencing proceeding.88  As a condition precedent to receiving a 
death sentence, the defendant must be death-eligible.89  That 
determination involves a two-prong inquiry that is litigated in an 
adversarial setting as part of the sentencing proceeding. 
Before a federal capital defendant is eligible to receive a death 
sentence, the government must first establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant committed the predicate offense with the requisite 
mens rea by proving a statutory intent factor.90  Second, the government 
must establish at least one statutory aggravating factor beyond a 
reasonable doubt.91  Therefore, as Alexander Bunin observes, “The 
effect of the [FDPA] is that a defendant is not eligible for the federal 
death penalty until a jury has found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the 
culpable mental state and at least one statutory aggravating factor.”92 
It follows, then, that until the jury determines that the government 
has met its burden of proof in the eligibility phase, the maximum 
punishment that a defendant who has been convicted of a predicate 
offense faces is life in prison.93  As a result, both the statutory intent 
factor and the statutory aggravating factor can fairly be described as 
“elements of federal capital murder”94—or, at least, their “functional 
equivalent.”95   
 
 88. See Bunin, supra note 8, at 268-69; see also Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d at 1119-20 (“Upon 
finding the intent factor and one statutory aggravating factor, a defendant becomes ‘eligible’ for the 
death penalty.”). 
 89. See generally United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 936, 937-42 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
 90. 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2) (2000) (prescribing the culpable mental states that may make a 
defendant eligible for the death penalty under the FDPA). 
 91. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)-(e).  See, e.g., United States v. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 672, 682 (E.D. 
Va. 2002) (the court explained that “the Defendant could not be sentenced to death based solely 
upon the jurors’ finding of non-statutory aggravating factors”). 
 92. Bunin, supra note 8, at 268.  See United States v. Fell, 372 F. Supp. 2d 753, 762-63 (D. 
Vt. 2005) (outlining the government’s burden during the eligibility phase). 
 93. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (“If no aggravating factor set forth in section 3592 is found to exist, 
the court shall impose a sentence other than death authorized by law.”).  See supra note 83 and 
accompanying text. 
 94. Bunin, supra note 8, at 268 (emphasis added). 
 95. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 605-09 (2002) (explaining that aggravating 
circumstances operate as the “functional equivalent” of elements of a capital offense).  
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Due to its adversarial nature, the penalty phase of a federal capital 
trial (and therefore the eligibility determination), in many respects, 
resembles the guilt-innocence phase.96  As the dissent in Fields 
observed, the penalty phase of capital sentencing proceedings conducted 
under the FDPA conspicuously mirrors the characteristics of a criminal 
trial in several ways: 
The FDPA provides for jury sentencing. . . . Both sides are represented 
by counsel and present evidence; the Court instructs the jury; the 
Government, and then defense counsel, presents closing argument; the 
Government must prove aggravating factors beyond a reasonable 
doubt; the jury returns a formal verdict, and its verdict must be 
unanimous.97 
Also, like a criminal trial, the eligibility determination of a federal 
capital sentencing proceeding, in particular, requires the jury to make 
significant factual determinations,98 as discussed supra: (1) whether the 
Government has established the statutory intent factor beyond a 
reasonable doubt;99 and (2) whether the Government has proven beyond 
a reasonable doubt the existence of at least one statutory aggravating 
factor.100  
Notwithstanding this very trial-like proceeding, during the penalty 
phase of a federal capital trial, “a defendant facing the death penalty is 
afforded fewer procedural protections than most defendants charged 
with simple misdemeanors.”101  As to the right of confrontation, 
Professor Douglas put it this way: “[W]hen it comes to confrontation, we 
now have a sentencing world that accords a . . . criminal defendant 
 
 96. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b)-(d).  See also United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 371-72 (5th 
Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S.Ct. 1065, 169 L.Ed.2d 814 (2008) (Benavides, C.J., dissenting) (for a 
good discussion of the similarities between the guilt-innocence phase and the penalty phase of 
federal capital trials). 
 97. Fields, 483 F.3d at 372 (Benavides, C.J., dissenting) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b)).  See 18 
U.S.C. § 3593(b).  See also United States v. Sablan, No. 00-00531, 2008 WL 700172, at *2, 75 Fed. 
R. Evid. Serv. 1187 (D. Colo. 2008) (“Under the FDPA, there are trial-like procedures that require 
specific findings by the jury, including not only the existence of the statutory aggravating factors 
(the eligibility phase) but also the existence of nonstatutory aggravating factors which must be 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 98. Under the FDPA, a jury usually conducts the factfinding that takes place during the 
sentencing phase.  The defendant has a statutory right to a jury determination regarding both his or 
her death eligibility and the appropriate sentence; however, a jury is not required, and the defendant 
may waive this right. With the permission of the government, a judge may make both 
determinations.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (c). 
 99. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a) (2). 
 100. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (c)-(d). 
 101. Houser, supra note 4, at 351 (2007).  See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). 
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facing death no more procedural rights than we accord a civil defendant 
contesting monetary damages.”102  
Indeed, the sentencing procedure prescribed by the FDPA explicitly 
dispenses with the formal rules of evidence.  In other words, during the 
penalty phase of federal capital trials, the government need not adhere to 
the strictures imposed by the Federal Rules of Evidence.103  During the 
sentencing phase of a federal capital trial, 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), by its 
terms, authorizes judges, subject only to a limited balancing test and the 
trial judge’s discretion, to admit any information that is relevant to an 
aggravating factor.104  The statutory rubric delineated by 18 U.S.C. § 
3593(c) only circumscribes the government’s ability to offer evidence 
that is prejudicial, confusing, or misleading, thereby ceding to federal 
judges substantial discretion regarding the type of evidence they may 
admit during this stage of federal capital trials.105  
This relaxed evidentiary standard prescribed by 18 U.S.C. § 
3593(c) has led to a disturbing result: in the sentencing phase of federal 
capital cases the government has been permitted to adduce as evidence 
“statements of witnesses who neither appear nor are cross-examined.”106  
In the sentencing phase of federal capital trials conducted under the 
FDPA, for example, courts have allowed the government to elicit third-
party testimony regarding the statements of an unavailable witness,107 as 
well as testimony from a police officer as to what others had told him or 
her about the defendant’s alleged conduct or uncharged prior criminal 
activity.108  In a similar vein, transcripts of witnesses’ testimony have 
 
 102. Douglas, supra note 8, at 1983.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). 
 103. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). 
 104. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c).  See United States v. Lee, 274 F.3d 485, 494 (8th Cir. 2001) (“The 
Federal Death Penalty Act . . . erects very low barriers to the admission of evidence at capital 
sentencing hearings.”). 
 105. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). 
 106. White, supra note 49, at 392. 
 107. Id. at 390 (2007).  See, e.g., United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 1360-61 (11th Cir. 
2006) (the court applied the Confrontation Clause per Crawford but yet allowed a witness to testify 
to the contents of a discussion she had with the victim’s husband, reasoning that those statements 
were nontestimonial); United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 485 (D. Vt. 2002) (witness was 
permitted to testify to statements made by a deceased codefendant); United States v. Johnson, 378 
F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1054-62 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (the court allowed testimony by jailhouse informant 
regarding what the defendant’s former boyfriend told him about her involvement in the charged 
crime). 
 108. See, e.g., United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 325 (5th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 
S.Ct. 1065, 169 L.Ed.2d 814 (2008) (During the sentencing phase of Fields’s trial, the court 
admitted “statements made by witnesses to police officers while the officers were investigating 
various past crimes in which Fields may have been involved but for which he was never charged 
[the statements being described in the officers’ testimony].”); Chandler v. Moore, 240 F.3d 907, 918 
(11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Grande, 353 F. Supp. 2d 623, 635-38 (E.D. Va. 2005). This 
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been admitted over Confrontation Clause objections.109  Consequently, 
the government has been able to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt no 
less, the death eligibility of federal capital defendants based, at least in 
part, on statements of declarants whom the defendant has not had the 
opportunity to cross-examine.   
The allowance of the aforementioned evidence within the FDPA’s 
procedural mandate generally stems from the significantly limited scope 
of a defendant’s confrontation rights in sentencing proceedings.110  
However, in light of the fact that the sentencing hearing is a forum in 
which the litigation of  “aggravating factors [that] operate as ‘the 
functional equivalent of . . . element[s] of . . . [the] greater offense’ “ of 
federal capital murder takes place111—and, therefore, involves more than 
just a sentence-selection decision112—a failure to decouple the eligibility 
determination from the sentence selection, for constitutional purposes, 
renders hollow more recent landmark Supreme Court precedent, tracing 
its genesis to Apprendi v. New Jersey.113 
III. THE CONCEPT OF “FUNCTIONAL EQUIVALENCE” AT SENTENCING 
A. The Landmark Decisions of Apprendi and Ring 
Apprendi involved a challenge to a New Jersey statute that, after a 
defendant had been convicted of a qualifying predicate offense under a 
separate statute, allowed the trial judge to enhance that defendant’s 
 
problem is not confined to federal capital trials.  See, e.g., People v. Moore, 662 N.E.2d 1215, 1232-
33 (Ill. 1996) (law enforcement officer permitted to testify as to what a correctional officer had told 
him about defendant’s propensity for violence).  But see State v. Bell, 359 N.C. 1, 603 S.E.2d 93, 
115-16 (N.C. 2004) (in a capital sentencing context, the court applied the Confrontation Clause, as 
interpreted by Crawford, and concluded that a police officer’s testimony as to statements by an 
alleged victim of the defendant regarding his alleged prior criminal conduct were testimonial and 
thus inadmissible); Russeau v. State, 171 S.W.3d 871, 881 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005), cert. denied, 
126 S.Ct. 2982 (2006). 
 109. See Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 398 (7th Cir. 2002); Del Vecchio v. Ill. Dep’t of Corr., 
31 F.3d 1363, 1387-88 (7th Cir. 1994). 
 110. See, e.g., United States v. Cantellano, 430 F.3d 1142, 1146 (11th Cir. 2005) (declining to 
extend Crawford to non-capital sentencing proceedings, the court opined that “[t]he right to 
confrontation is not a sentencing right”); United States v. Roche, 415 F.3d 614, 618 (7th Cir. 2005), 
cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1024, 126 S.Ct. 671, 163 L.Ed.2d 541 (2005) (observing that neither the 
Confrontation Clause nor Crawford apply at sentencing).  See White, supra note 49, at 402.  See 
also Douglas, supra note 8, at 1981 (The Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA) of 1994 likewise 
codifies Williams for federal capital cases.”). 
 111. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 494 n.19 (2000)).  See Bunin, supra note 8, at 235 (pointing out that aggravating factors are, in 
reality, elements of federal capital murder). 
 112. See infra notes 122-143 and accompanying text. 
 113. 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
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sentence if he or she concluded that the underlying offense constituted a 
hate crime.114  The New Jersey statute prescribed a sentencing procedure 
whereby the trial judge could impose a sentencing enhancement if he or 
she found by preponderant evidence that “‘[t]he defendant in committing 
the crime acted with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of 
individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual 
orientation or ethnicity.’”115  In striking down New Jersey’s sentencing 
scheme, the Supreme Court held that “[o]ther than the fact of a prior 
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”116   
The Court endorsed the view that “[i]t is unconstitutional for a 
legislature to remove from the jury the assessment of facts that increase 
the prescribed range of penalties to which a criminal defendant is 
exposed.”117  In reaching that conclusion, the Court noted that a survey 
of the historical record evinces a single, recurring theme: “The judge’s 
role in sentencing is constrained at its outer limits by the facts . . . found 
by the jury.  [F]acts that expose a defendant to a punishment greater than 
that otherwise legally prescribed were by definition ‘elements’ of a 
separate legal offense.”118 
 
 114. See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 468-75, 492-93. 
 115. Id. at 468-69. 
 116. Id. at 490.  It is worth mentioning that the Court did not decide Apprendi in a 
jurisprudential vacuum.  In Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999), a precursor to Apprendi, in 
construing a federal statute, the Court intimated the result in Apprendi, noting that “under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the notice and jury trial guarantees of the Sixth 
Amendment, any fact (other than prior conviction) that increases the maximum penalty for a crime 
must be charged in an indictment, submitted to a jury, and proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Id. 
at 243, n.6.  See generally Thomas Aumann, Note, Death by Peers: The Extension of the Sixth 
Amendment to Capital Sentencing in Ring v. Arizona, 34 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 845, 871 (2003) 
(explaining that “the [Jones] Court created a ‘maximum punishment test’ to gauge whether a 
sentence enhancer should be treated as an element of a crime”). 
 117. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 (quoting Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 252-53 (1999) 
(Stevens, J., concurring) (alterations omitted)).  See also Jones, 526 U.S. at 244 (In discussing “the 
history bearing on the Framers’ understanding of the Sixth Amendment,” the Court noted the 
Framers’ general intolerance of procedures that allowed for “exclusively judicial factfinding to peg 
penalty limits.”). 
 118. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 483 n.10.   The Court’s holding in Apprendi generated at least one 
facial challenge to an existing capital punishment scheme, e.g., Oken v. State, 786 A.2d 691 (Md. 
2001), cert. denied, 535 U.S. 1074 (2002). In Oken, inter alia, the Maryland Court of Appeals 
cursorily rejected the argument that Maryland’s death penalty statute was rendered unconstitutional 
by the Court’s decision in Apprendi, because “Apprendi ‘represents a watershed rule of 
Constitutional law that fundamentally alters the standard of proof and the manner in which capital 
sentencing hearings are to be conducted in this State,’” as well as the argument that “[i]n light of 
Apprendi, the Maryland death penalty statute is unconstitutional on its face because it provides that 
a   sentence of death may be imposed if the State proves that the aggravating factors outweigh any 
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In rejecting the notion that a legislature could dispense with 
defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial through categorizing 
additional post-conviction facts as “sentencing factors,” the Court 
opined: “[T]he relevant inquiry is one not of form, but of effect—does 
the required finding expose the defendant to a greater punishment than 
that authorized by the jury’s guilty verdict?”119  As the Court further 
elucidated: 
[W]hen the term “sentence enhancement” is used to describe an 
increase beyond the maximum authorized statutory sentence, it is the 
functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense than the one 
covered by the jury’s guilty verdict.  Indeed, it fits squarely within the 
usual definition of an “element” of the offense.120 
Accordingly, Apprendi announced a “bright-line rule” that 
expanded the scope of the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial to 
include post-conviction proceedings—regardless of label—where factual 
findings, other than the fact of a prior conviction, are made that can 
increase the maximum penalty to which a defendant is exposed.121 
Two years after Apprendi was decided, in Ring v. Arizona,122 the 
Supreme Court extended Apprendi’s holding to apply to capital 
sentencing proceedings.123  At issue in Ring was the scope of the “Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial in capital prosecutions.”124  In Walton v. 
Arizona, decided ten years before Apprendi, the Court had upheld an 
Arizona capital sentencing scheme on the ground that the State is not 
constitutionally “required to denominate aggravating circumstances 
‘elements’ of the offense or permit only a jury to determine the existence 
 
mitigating factors by only a preponderance of the evidence.”  Id. at 196-98.  After Ring and 
Crawford, however, the constitutional analysis has significantly changed, and there are additional 
grounds on which to mount a facial challenge of existing capital punishment schemes. 
 119. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 494. 
 120. Id. (emphasis added).  As the Court explained in Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 
(2004), “the relevant ‘statutory maximum’ is not the maximum sentence a judge may impose after 
finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings.”  Id. at 
303-04 (emphasis in original). 
 121. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 288-89 (2007) (citation omitted). The 
Cunningham majority explained: “As this Court’s decisions instruct, the Federal Constitution’s 
jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence above 
the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or 
admitted by the defendant.” Id. at 274-75 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466; accord Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. 584 (2002); Blakely, 542 U.S. 296; United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005)). 
 122. 536 U.S. 584. 
 123. Id. at 609. 
 124. Id. at 588. 
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of such circumstances.”125  Under Arizona’s capital sentencing statute, 
“following a jury adjudication of a defendant’s guilt of first-degree 
murder, the trial judge, sitting alone, determine[d] the presence or 
absence of the aggravating factors required . . . for imposition of the 
death penalty.”126  The Court in Ring struck down the Arizona capital 
punishment scheme, reasoning that “[b]ecause Arizona’s enumerated 
aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of 
a greater offense,’ the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a 
jury.”127  
To be sure, on its face, Ring’s holding was limited to addressing the 
scope of the Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury; however, its holding 
has much broader implications.128  Professor Douglas argues that where 
Ring applies, it not only grants capital defendants a Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial but also, inter alia, affords defendants a Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation:  
[T]his conclusion flows logically from Ring’s statement that a fact that 
elevates the potential maximum punishment is the “functional 
equivalent of an element” of a crime.  Whatever else the Sixth 
Amendment covers, there can be little doubt that it applies, in all 
respects, at a proceeding before a jury where adversaries contest 
elements of a criminal offense.129   
The plurality opinion in Harris v. United States,130 decided by the 
Supreme Court the same day as Ring, bolsters that conclusion.  In 
Harris, Justice Kennedy, writing for the plurality, explained: “[T]hose 
facts setting the outer limits of a sentence, and of the judicial power to 
 
 125. Walton v. Arizona, 497 U. S. 639, 649 (1990). 
 126. Ring, 536 U.S. at 588. 
 127. Id. at 609 (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U. S. 466, 494 n.19 (2000)). 
 128. See Douglas, supra note 8, at 1997. Cf. Szabo v. Walls, 313 F.3d 392, 399 (7th Cir. 2002) 
(“We need not attempt to predict how the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence will develop; Apprendi 
and Ring may portend more changes and may eventually be applied to the balancing phase of 
capital sentencing . . . .”). 
 129. Douglas, supra note 8, at 1997.  Professor Douglas’s argument makes an eminent amount 
of sense, because, as he points out, the Sixth Amendment’s text “suggests a distinction between the 
jury right, which by the terms of the Amendment applies to a ‘trial,’ and the rights to notice, 
confrontation, compulsory process, and counsel, which apply more broadly to the whole criminal 
prosecution . . . .”  Id. at 2009.  See HELLER, supra note 19, at 35 (observing that, as a textual 
matter, the ambit of the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is limited by the phrase “in all 
criminal prosecutions”).  In short, as a textual matter, if the narrower Sixth Amendment jury-trial 
right applies, it necessarily follows that the Confrontation Clause also applies. 
 130. 536 U.S. 545 (2002) (plurality opinion).  Harris involved the issue of factfinding in the 
context of 218 U.S.C. § 924(c), which, like the statute at issue in Apprendi, provided for mandatory 
minimum sentences.  Id. 
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impose it, are the elements of the crime for the purposes of the 
constitutional analysis.”131  As Professor Douglas observes, his position 
also finds support in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion in Schriro v. 
Summerlin.132  According to Justice Scalia’s reasoning, Ring stands for 
the broad proposition that where statutory aggravating factors, as a 
matter of law, limit “the class of death-eligible defendants, those 
aggravators effectively [are] elements for federal constitutional purposes, 
and [are therefore] subject to the procedural requirements the 
Constitution attaches to a trial of elements.”133 
In a similar vein, Alexander Bunin submits that, at least as of 2003, 
there was a consensus understanding in the Supreme Court that “[l]ike it 
or not, statutory aggravating circumstances are capital elements.”134  As 
Bunin points out,135 in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, Justice Scalia’s 
opinion announcing the judgment of the Court, in which then-Chief 
Justice Renquist and Justice Thomas joined, explained that any facts that 
must be established as a condition precedent to imposing a death 
sentence are elements of capital murder—the particular label affixed to 
the proceeding in which that factfinding occurs is immaterial.136  As 
Justice Scalia put it, “‘murder plus one or more aggravating 
circumstances’ is a separate offense from ‘murder’ simpliciter.”137  As a 
corollary to that proposition, Sattazahn made it clear that any factfinding 
that is necessary to expose a capital defendant to the possibility of a 
death sentence must take place within a framework that provides the 
defendant with at least some trial protections—e.g., a jury must make 
 
 131. Id. at 567 (plurality opinion). In his concurring opinion in Ring, Justice Scalia put it thus: 
“[T]he fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment is that all facts 
essential to imposition of the level of punishment that the defendant receives—whether the statute 
calls them elements of the offense, sentencing factors, or Mary Jane—must be found by the jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.”  Ring, 536 U.S. at 610 (Scalia, J. concurring). 
 132. Douglas, supra note 8, at 1997-98. 
 133. Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 354 (2004) (citing Ring, 536 U.S. at 609) (emphasis 
in original). 
 134. Bunin, supra note 8, at 248. But see State v. Mata, 745 N.W.2d 229, 247 (Neb. 2008) 
(“We reaffirm our holding . . . that Ring is not a substantive change in Sixth Amendment 
requirements and did not make aggravating circumstances essential elements of capital murder.”). 
 135. Bunin, supra note 8, at 247. 
 136. Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 106-11 (2003) (plurality opinion) (holding that 
if a defendant is acquitted of capital elements—i.e., the jury finds an absence of aggravating 
factors—the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy Clause bars a death sentence on retrial).  As 
Justice Scalia explained in Sattazahn, “If a jury unanimously concludes that a State has failed to 
meet its burden of proving the existence of one or more aggravating circumstances, double-jeopardy 
protections attach to that “acquittal” on the offense of “murder plus aggravating circumstance(s).”  
Id. at 112. 
 137. Id. at 112. 
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those factual findings beyond a reasonable doubt.138  And, as Bunin 
notes, the four dissenting justices in Sattazahn—Justices Ginsberg, 
Souter, Stevens, and Breyer—reached the same conclusion:139 “for 
purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause, capital sentencing proceedings 
involving proof of one or more aggravating factors are to be treated as 
trials of separate offenses, not merely sentencing proceedings.”140 
As the foregoing cases make clear, the guilt-innocence phase of a 
capital trial does not conclusively demarcate the outer boundary of a 
capital defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights.141  Rather, the Supreme 
Court’s Sixth Amendment jury-trial right jurisprudence, per Apprendi 
and Ring, indicates that at least some of a capital defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment trial rights are fully operative at least up until the eligibility 
determination, where further proof is required to establish additional 
 
 138. See id. at 110-11. 
 139. Bunin, supra note 8, at 247. 
 140. Sattazahn, 537 U.S. at 126 n.6 (Ginsburg, J, dissenting).  Accord Bullington v. Missouri, 
451 U.S. 430, 446 (1981) (“Because the sentencing proceeding at [issue] was like the trial on the 
question of guilt or innocence, the protection afforded by the Double Jeopardy Clause to one 
acquitted by a jury . . . is available to [the defendant], with respect to the death penalty . . . .”).  In 
Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 459 (1984), the Court cautioned that that analogy should not be 
read too broadly: “The fact that a capital sentencing is like a trial in the respects significant to the 
Double Jeopardy Clause . . . does not mean that it is like a trial in the respects significant to the 
Sixth Amendment’s guarantee of a jury trial.”  However, the limiting phrase for the Sixth 
Amendment right to a jury trial is more restrictive than the phrase “in all criminal prosecutions,” 
which limits the scope of the Confrontation Clause, see supra note 129. Cf. Counselman v. 
Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 563 (1892) (“A criminal prosecution under article 6 of the amendments, is 
much narrower than a ‘criminal case,’ under article 5 of the amendments.”).  Thus, O.H. Eaton’s 
assertion that because Spaziano “recognized that a penalty-phase proceeding is ‘like a trial,’ at least 
for Fifth Amendment double-jeopardy purposes…it logically follows that an accused has the Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation if testimony is offered at ‘trial’ “ may be quite valid.   Hon. O.H. 
Eaton, Jr., Capital Punishment: An Examination of Current Issues and Trends and How These 
Developments May Impact the Death Penalty in Florida, 34 STETSON L. REV. 9, 39 (2005). 
 141.  See, e.g., Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134-37 (1967) (holding that the Sixth 
Amendment right to counsel applies at sentencing, whether capital or otherwise).  See Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1998); Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1983); Estelle v. 
Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981).  See generally Bullington, 451 U.S. at 438-39 & n.10 (1981) (in 
holding that the Double Jeopardy Clause applied to a capital sentencing hearing because it had a 
trial-like format, which provided for opening statements, formal testimony, jury instructions, proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt of aggravating factors, final arguments, and a formal jury verdict, the 
Court indicated that if a sentencing hearing is adversarial in character, i.e., it bears the “hallmarks of 
the trial on guilt or innocence,” certain “trial rights” will apply); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 
815, 856 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“As a practical matter [the Court] ha[s] 
virtually required that the death penalty be imposed only when a guilty verdict has been followed by 
separate trial-like sentencing proceedings, and we have extended many of the procedural restrictions 
applicable during criminal trials into these proceedings.” (citations omitted)). 
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elements of a new offense.142  Moreover, post-Williams, Apprendi and its 
progeny have made clear that there is a distinct difference in the 
application of constitutional rights during the litigation of statutory 
aggravating factors (i.e., the eligibility determination) and sentence 
selection.  This includes the right of confrontation, and at least four 
federal trial courts have interpreted Ring to stand for such a 
proposition.143 
B. Applying Theory in the District Courts 
In United States v. Mills, for example, the court concluded that 
Ring “support[s] the proposition that a defendant’s Sixth Amendment 
trial rights extend at least to the eligibility phase of capital sentencing, 
where a jury is required to find facts that make the defendant eligible for 
the death penalty.”144  Reasoning analogically, the Mills court noted that 
although Ring did not squarely address the scope of capital defendants’ 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, the Court’s analysis and 
extension of the Sixth Amendment jury-trial right to the eligibility 
determination “strongly suggests that the Confrontation Clause . . . 
applies to the eligibility phase.”145  The Mills court put it this way: 
“[O]nce the activity of a sentencer stops being an exercise of discretion 
and becomes constitutionally significant factfinding, the right to 
confrontation attaches.”146 
The Mills case followed, both chronologically and as a matter of 
precedent, other federal trial courts that had found that the nature of 
death eligibility determinations, in light of Ring, triggered the 
Confrontation Clause per Crawford.  The courts in United States v. 
Johnson, United States v. Jordan, and United States v. Bodkins, adopted 
 
 142. Carol S. Steiker, Things Fall Apart, But the Center Holds: The Supreme Court and the 
Death Penalty, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1475, 1481 (2002) (recognizing the potential long-term 
ramifications of the Court’s holding in Ring). 
 143. See United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d. 1115, 1125 (C.D. Cal. 2006).  In a similar 
vein, in United States v. Jordan, the district court concluded that the Confrontation Clause, as 
interpreted in Crawford, applies to bar the admission of testimonial hearsay relevant to the 
eligibility determination in federal capital trials.  357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903-04 (E.D. Va. 2005).  
Accord United States v. Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 2d 1051, 1064-65 (N.D. Iowa 2005); United States v. 
Bodkins, No. CRIM.A- 4:04CR70083, 2005 WL 1118158, at *4-*5 (W.D. Va. 2005); United States 
v. Concepcion Sablan, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1221 (D. Colo. 2007) (“[U]nder Crawford, the 
Confrontation Clause is applicable at both the eligibility phase and at least a portion of the selection 
phase . . . . [Because] the existence of all the aggravating factors are constitutionally significant 
facts that should be found by the jury.”). 
 144. Mills, 446 F.Supp.2d. at 1125. 
 145. Id. at 1127-28. 
 146. Id. at 1125. 
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the view shared later in Mills and, at least with respect to the 
applicability of the Confrontation Clause to federal eligibility 
determinations, espoused by the authors.147  Moreover, state courts in 
Florida, North Carolina, and Texas have reached similar conclusions 
within the context of their respective capital sentencing schemes.148 
Beginning with Jordan, through Mills, and into the state courts, 
there is more than ample evidence that Ring is a hugely pivotal case in 
this realm of capital sentencing jurisprudence, and that its holding has 
dramatically altered the juridical landscape.  Its recency and the 
contextual trend within which it was decided render it all the more 
noteworthy when evaluating the viability of any proposed application of 
the Sixth Amendment to capital litigation.  Finally, its language has been 
perceived by other courts to be clear and persuasive enough that, in 
effect, its holding served as the jurisprudential anchor undergirding the 
holdings in the aforementioned cases.  
 Interestingly enough, however, language drafted more than two 
centuries ago—memorialized in the text of the Sixth Amendment 
itself—further suggests what we seek to extrapolate from Ring, which 
was recognized in Johnson and Mills, et al.: The Sixth Amendment right 
of confrontation extends to federal death-eligibility determinations.  
Below, we discuss the significance and meaning of the Sixth 
Amendment’s key limiting phrase—”[i]n all criminal prosecutions”—
and the effect its accurate interpretation should have on the application 
of the Confrontation Clause to death-eligibility determinations.149 
IV. ELIGIBILITY DETERMINATIONS AND “CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS” 
Apprendi, Ring, and logical extensions of stare decisis aside, a 
parallel analysis of our issue begins with the literal text of the Sixth 
Amendment and its unequivocal statement that the right of confrontation 
applies “[i]n all criminal prosecutions.”150  We use the word “parallel” 
because this analysis begs the question.  That is, one could conclude that 
the aforementioned case law proves that the Confrontation Clause is 
operative at federal death eligibility determinations, and, therefore, it is 
 
 147. See supra note 143. 
 148. See supra note 69. 
 149. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  Of course, as Professor Douglas points out, “[t]he Framers knew 
nothing of a ‘guilt’ phase and a ‘penalty’ phase” of a capital trial; at that time, the guilt and penalty 
determinations were collapsed into a single jury verdict, rendered at the conclusion of the 
defendant’s trial.  Douglas, supra note 8, at 1967. 
 150. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI.  See also United States v. Rondeau, 430 F.3d 44, 47 (1st Cir. 
2005) (observing “that the Confrontation Clause focuses on “criminal prosecutions”). 
27
Pepson and Sharifi: Two Wrongs Don't Make a Right
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2010
FINAL PEPSON_SHARIFI_MACRO 1.11.10.DOC 1/25/2010  2:32 PM 
28 AKRON LAW REVIEW [43:1 
within the meaning of the phrase “criminal prosecution,” as that phrase 
is used in the Sixth Amendment.  Or one could draw the same 
conclusion as to the ambit of the Confrontation Clause by beginning 
with the definition of “criminal prosecution” and working vice versa.151  
In this section, we do the latter. 
As Professor Penny White notes, Webster’s An American 
Dictionary of the English Language, which was published in 1828—the 
dictionary Justice Scalia used to define “witness” and “testimony” in 
Crawford,152 and Justice Thomas referred to in his concurring opinion in 
White v. Illinois153—defines the term “prosecution” as follows: the 
“institution or commencement and continuance of a criminal suit; the 
process of exhibiting formal charges against an offender before a legal 
tribunal, and pursing them to final judgment.”154  As Penny White points 
out, modern dictionaries supply substantially similar definitions.155  An 
edition of Webster’s printed in 1972, for example, defines the term thus: 
“the institution and continuance of a criminal suit involving the process 
of pursuing formal charges against an offender to final judgment.”156 
Indeed, in his Commentaries, Sir William Blackstone expressly 
assumes that the term “criminal prosecution” subsumes within it 
proceedings subsequent to the guilt-innocence determination: 
[T]he next stage of criminal prosecution, after trial and conviction are 
past, in such crimes and misdemeanors . . . is that of judgment.  For 
when, upon a capital charge, the jury have brought in their verdict 
guilty, in the presence of the prisoner; he is either immediately, or at a 
convenient time soon after, asked by the court, if he has anything to 
offer why judgment should not be awarded against him.157 
Needless to say, his understanding of that phrase is of special 
relevance, because Blackstone’s Commentaries served as a conduit 
through which English jurisprudential developments influenced the 
 
 151. See White, supra note 49, at 393-96 (for a good overview of that argument); HELLER, 
supra note 19, at 35 (Heller submits that “[w]hat th[o]se . . . opening words of the [Sixth 
A]mendment, could be taken to mean would determine, therefore, where and how far the rights 
guaranteed by th[at] amendment could be invoked.”). 
 152. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004). 
 153. 502 U.S. 346, 360 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 154. White, supra note 49, at 395-96 (quoting 2 NOAH WEBSTER, AN AMERICAN DICTIONARY 
OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 45 (New York, S. Converse 1828)). 
 155. Id. at 395-96. 
 156. WEBSTER’S SEVENTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 684 (G. & C. Merriam Company 
1972) (1916). 
 157. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *375. 
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Framers and thus affected the development of the Constitution.158  
According to Professor Jonakait, Blackstone’s Commentaries had such a 
profound influence on the Framers’ generation that it “was often used by 
practitioners ‘as a shortcut to the law.’”159 
Constitutional historian Francis Heller drew a similar conclusion.  
He opined that “[t]he language of the Sixth Amendment”—which, at 
least as a general proposition, is limited in scope by the phrase “criminal 
prosecution”—“has been interpreted to make its guarantees effective 
only in the course of criminal trials proper,” which “terminate[] with the 
pronouncement of sentence by the court.”160  Concordant with that view, 
in United States v. Reisinger, the Supreme Court endorsed the 
proposition that “the word ‘prosecution’ . . . ‘usually denotes a criminal 
proceeding.’”161  More recently, in Morrissey v. Brewer, in concluding 
that parole revocation hearings are outside the ambit of the Sixth 
Amendment, the Court at least tacitly intimated that the phrase “criminal 
prosecution” includes sentencing, noting that “[p]arole arises after the 
end of the criminal prosecution, including imposition of sentence.”162 
The definitional authority buttresses the position that when a new 
offense is created through the addition of an element, as is the case 
during the eligibility determination per Apprendi and Ring, supra, there 
continues the criminal prosecution.  Syllogistically speaking, then, the 
right of confrontation should apply during the eligibility determination, 
because the eligibility determination falls squarely within the ambit of 
the term “criminal prosecution.”  
With that said, let us turn from the scope of the right of 
confrontation, as defined in the text of the Sixth Amendment itself, to its 
substance.  This is germane to our discussion because, as discussed 
 
 158. See Randolph N. Jonakait, The Origins of the Confrontation Clause: An Alternative 
History, 27 RUTGERS L.J. 77, 97 (1995).  See also BEDAU, supra note 31, at 6. 
 159. Jonakait, supra note 158, at 95, n.94 (1995) (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A 
HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 112 (1985)). 
 160. HELLER, supra note 19, at 54. 
 161. 128 U.S. 398, 402-03 (1888) (quoting United States v. Ulrici, 3 Dillon 532, 328 F. Cas. 
328 (C.C.Mo. 1875)) (as the Reisinger Court explained, in Ulrici, “[i]t became necessary . . . to 
determine the meaning of the word[] ‘prosecution’ “).  To be sure, the FDPA expressly provides 
that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply to proceedings conducted under it.  See 18 U.S.C. 
3593(c) (2000).  See also FED. R. EVID. 802 (“Hearsay is not admissible except as provided by these 
rules or by other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority or by Act of 
Congress.”).  It is worth noting, however, that the Federal Rules of Evidence seem to recognize a 
similar dichotomy between criminal proceedings and sentencings.  Compare FED. R. EVID. 1101(b) 
(“These rules apply generally to . . . criminal cases and proceedings . . . .”) (emphasis added), with 
FED. R. EVID. 1101(d) (“The [Federal Rules of Evidence] . . . do not apply [at] . . . sentencing . . . 
.”). 
 162. 408 U.S. 471, 480 (1972) (emphasis added). 
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infra, the exact nature of the procedural protections the Sixth 
Amendment right of confrontation requires has now been famously 
specified by the Supreme Court in Crawford; and those procedures 
precisely seek to prevent the admission of evidence that is now so easily 
offered against capital defendants under the FDPA. 
V. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION,  
ITS HISTORY, AND CRAWFORD 
A.  The Framers’ Intent 
In Crawford, the Supreme Court had the opportunity to flesh out 
the exact nature of the procedural right the Confrontation Clause of the 
Sixth Amendment affords criminal defendants.163  The specific issue in 
Crawford was whether, consistent with the Sixth Amendment’s 
Confrontation Clause, a witness’s tape-recorded statement to police 
regarding the alleged criminal conduct of the defendant could be 
admitted at his criminal trial, “even though he had no opportunity for 
cross-examination” and the witness did not testify.164  Drawing 
substantially from the Framers’ original intent,165 the Court ruled that the 
statement was inadmissible, holding, in essence, that anything to the 
contrary would violate the most basic premise of the right of 
confrontation.166  Accordingly, the specifics of Crawford should be 
preceded with a brief discussion of the historical context within which it 
was decided, so that the rationale undergirding its holding can more 
readily be understood. 
Unlike the limited due process right of confrontation that criminal 
defendants enjoy in certain post-conviction proceedings, which finds its 
genesis in a judicial decision rendered less than forty years ago,167 the 
 
 163. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 55 (2004). 
 164. See id. at 38. 
 165. See Kristen Sluyter, Note, Evidence—Sixth Amendment and the Confrontation Clause—
Testimonial Trumps Reliable: The United States Supreme Court Reconsiders Its Approach to the 
Confrontation Clause.  Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 26 (2004), 27 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. 
REV. 323, 342-44 (2005) (observing that the Crawford majority reached its ultimate conclusion by 
reference to the history of the right of confrontation).  See generally Thomas J. Walsh, The 
Confrontation Clause After Crawford v. Washington: Clarifying the Meaning of Testimonial 
Statements in Criminal Trials, 85 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 163, 179-180 (2008); Robert P. 
Mosteller, Crawford v. Washington: Encouraging and Ensuring the Confrontation of Witnesses, 39 
U. RICH. L. REV. 511, 514-15 (2005). 
 166. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. 
 167. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (holding that, inter alia, due process requires that a 
parolee have “the right to confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer 
specifically finds good cause for not allowing confrontation)” at a parole revocation hearing) 
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more expansive right of confrontation enumerated in the Confrontation 
Clause is firmly rooted in our system of jurisprudence.  As Richard 
Friedman explains, today we take for granted “the idea that witnesses 
testify under oath in an open proceeding in the presence of the accused, 
‘face-to-face’”; but the idea that the accused has a right to confront his 
or her accusers is no mere transient notion, indeed, with exceptions, “for 
centuries it has been the English way.”168  To be sure, according to 
conventional wisdom, the right of confrontation guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment finds its proximate genesis in the English common law.169  
However, the underlying concept—the right of the accused to confront 
his or her accusers face-to-face—is much older, dating back to Roman 
times.170  In Coy v. Iowa, the Supreme Court explicitly recognized the 
right of confrontation’s historical underpinnings: “[It] ‘comes to us on 
 
(emphasis added).  Accord Gagnon v. Scarpelli,  411 U.S. 778, 786 (1973) (applying an identical 
standard in probation revocation proceedings).  The Morrissey Court reasoned that parolees do have 
a “conditional liberty” interest, see Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484, which cannot, consistent with the 
Fourteenth Amendment, be deprived without at least some due process, see id. at 482.  The Court 
noted, however, that “due process is flexible, and calls for such procedural protections as the 
particular situation demands.”  Id. at 481.  Applying the foregoing standard, the Morrissey Court 
ultimately concluded that parolees were only entitled to a limited, qualified right of confrontation, 
which could be abridged at the discretion of the trial judge.  See id. at 488-89. 
 168. Richard Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011, 
1022-23 (1997).  Of course, not all English trials were conducted in this manner.  See id. at 1024.  
See also LANGBEIN, supra note 31, at 233-35 & n.241 (discussing the history of the confrontation 
policy). 
 169. HELLER, supra note 19, at 104 (noting that the “immediate source” of the right of 
confrontation embodied in the Sixth Amendment is the English common law).  See Salinger v. 
United States, 272 U.S. 542, 548 (1926) (“The right of confrontation did not originate with the 
provision in the Sixth Amendment, but was a common-law right having recognized exceptions . . . 
.”).  See also Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826 (2006) (noting that English cases “were the 
progenitors of the Confrontation Clause”).  Cf. Friedman, supra note 169, at 1022 (“The origins of 
the [Confrontation] Clause are famously obscure.”).  But see Jonakait, supra note 158, at 81 
(arguing “that while seventeenth century English history, and other English actions, may have 
affected the development of American constitutional rights . . . [they] were not the prime or 
immediate cause of the Confrontation Clause”).  For a thorough overview of the history of 
confrontation at English common law, see generally Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: 
Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. L. 381 (1959). 
 170. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43 (citing Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1015 (1988)).  See JOSEPH 
PLESCIA, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND ROMAN LAW 84 (Austin & Winfield 1995).  See generally 
Frank R. Herrmann, S.J., and Brownlow M. Speer, Facing the Accuser: Ancient and Medieval 
Precursors of the Confrontation Clause, 34 VA. J. INT’L L. 481 (1994) (providing a thorough 
overview of the history and origin of the right of confrontation).  Indeed, according to one scholar, 
“[a]s far back as the ancient Babylonians there is reference to the procedure used to call forth 
witnesses in cases where a person stands accused of violating the law.”  Walsh, supra note 165, at 
164. 
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faded parchment,’ with a lineage that traces back to the beginnings of 
Western legal culture.”171 
The historical underpinnings of the right of confrontation secured 
by the Confrontation Clause are worthy of discussion because, as the 
Supreme Court pointed out over one hundred years ago in Mattox v. 
United States, those underpinnings inform the jurisprudential lens 
through which the scope and nature of that right is interpreted: 
We are bound to interpret the Constitution in the light of the law as it 
existed at the time it was adopted, not as reaching out for new 
guaranties of the rights of the citizen, but as securing to every 
individual such as he already possessed as a British subject—such as 
his ancestors had inherited and defended since the days of Magna 
Charta.172 
Showing similar deference to the Framers’ intent,173 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the majority in Crawford, put it thus: “The Constitution 
prescribes a procedure for determining the reliability of testimony in 
criminal trials, and we, no less than the state courts, lack authority to 
replace it with one of our own devising.”174 
 
 171. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1015 (quoting California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (Harlan, J., 
concurring)).  See Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959) (“the requirements of confrontation 
and cross-examination . . . have ancient roots . . . [and] find expression in the Sixth Amendment”).  
See generally Herrmann & Speer, supra note 171. 
 172. 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 60 (“Although the results of our 
decisions have generally been faithful to the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, the same 
cannot be said of our rationales.”). Cf. Jonakait, supra note 158, at 81 (arguing that “the 
Confrontation Clause, and related Sixth Amendment provisions, sought to constitutionalize criminal 
procedure as it then existed in the states”). 
 173. In Crawford, Justice Scalia explicitly recognized the inherent difficulties presented by any 
attempt to divine the Framers’ intent with regard to a practice that did not exist at the time of the 
framing but nonetheless thought it was a worthwhile endeavor.  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 n.3.  
To be sure, the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is not a substantive guarantee but rather a 
procedural right. Id. at 61.  See HELLER, supra note 19, at 35.  But, nonetheless, as Justice 
Frankfurter suggests, this does not diminish its importance to our system of jurisprudence: 
“[P]rocedural devices rooted in experience were written into the Bill of Rights not as abstract 
rubrics in an elegant code but in order to assure fairness and justice before any person could be 
deprived of ‘life, liberty or property.’”  Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 276 
(1942).  See also Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (“The fact that [right of confrontation] 
appears in the Sixth Amendment of our Bill of Rights reflects the belief of the Framers of those 
liberties and safeguards that confrontation was a fundamental right essential to a fair trial in a 
criminal prosecution.”).  
 174. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 67. Cf. Jonakait, supra note 158, at 82 (arguing that the Sixth 
Amendment “constitutionaliz[ed]” aspects of “criminal procedure”).  But see Green, 399 U.S. at 
176 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) (“Rights amendments [e.g., the Sixth Amendment] were 
primarily concerned with the political consequences of the new clauses, and paid scant attention to 
the definition and meaning of particular guarantees.”). 
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B.  Abrogating Judicial Determinations of “Reliability” 
Prior to Crawford, under Ohio v. Roberts, it was permissible for 
courts to admit testimony in the form of hearsay, even where the witness 
had never been cross-examined and was unavailable to testify, provided 
that the testimony was deemed sufficiently reliable by the trial judge.175  
Per Roberts, at the trial judge’s discretion, testimonial hearsay could be 
admitted in a criminal trial provided that it bore “adequate ‘indicia of 
reliability.’”176  To comply with the Roberts reliability standard and 
overcome any Confrontation Clause-based objection, such hearsay was 
required to satisfy at least one prong of a disjunctive, two-part test: it 
must either be within the ambit of a “firmly rooted hearsay exception” or 
demonstrate “particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.”177  Under 
Roberts, then, testimony in the form of hearsay would survive a 
Confrontation Clause objection based on a substantive, discretionary 
judicial determination that such hearsay was sufficiently reliable, 
thereby operating to deprive criminal defendants of two fundamental 
procedural safeguards: the right to confront, face-to-face, their accuser 
and the corollary right of cross-examination. 
Relying on Ohio v. Roberts, the trial court in Crawford found that 
the challenged statement bore “particularized guarantees of 
trustworthiness” and thus satisfied the demands of the Confrontation 
Clause, and it admitted the statement.178  The defendant was ultimately 
convicted and appealed.179  After applying a nine-factor test, the 
Washington Court of Appeals determined that the statement did not bear 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness and reversed.180  The 
Washington Supreme Court reversed the Washington Court of Appeals 
and unanimously concluded that the tape-recorded statement was 
admissible, reasoning that despite the absence of any firmly rooted 
 
 175. 448 U.S. 56 (1980), abrogated by Crawford, 541 U.S. 36.  Under Roberts, the 
Confrontation Clause “does not bar admission of an unavailable witness’s statement against a 
criminal defendant if the statement bears ‘adequate “indicia of reliability.”‘  To meet that test, 
evidence must either fall within a ‘firmly rooted hearsay exception’ or bear ‘particularized 
guarantees of trustworthiness.’” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). 
 176. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66-68. 
 177. See id. at 66 (delineating a test for whether the Confrontation Clause operates to bar the 
admission of hearsay during a criminal trial).  See generally Friedman, supra note 169, at 1017-22 
(for a good overview of the Roberts test).  Interestingly, even the Roberts Court notes “the Framers’ 
preference for face-to-face accusation” but concludes that, under the Sixth Amendment, exceptions 
exist out of “necessity.” Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65. 
 178. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40-41.   
 179. See id. 
 180. See id. 
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hearsay exception, the statement was sufficiently reliable to overcome 
any Confrontation Clause objection.181  The Crawford Court, however, 
disagreed and abrogated Roberts to the extent that its holding applied to 
testimonial evidence,182 concluding that the admission of testimonial 
hearsay in a criminal trial violated the Confrontation Clause.183   
At least regarding testimonial evidence,184 the majority in Crawford 
was troubled both by the substantive focus of the admissibility standard 
delineated by the Court in Roberts and the discretionary aspects of that 
framework.185  The problem with the Roberts reliability test: “Reliability 
is an amorphous, if not entirely subjective, concept. . . .  Whether a 
Statement is deemed reliable depends heavily on which factors the judge 
considers and how much weight he accords each of them.”186  
Consequently, the Crawford Court held that, regardless of how reliable 
the trial court may deem an out-of-court statement to be, the 
Confrontation Clause operates as a per se bar to the admission of out-of-
court testimony by a witness—i.e., testimonial hearsay—unless that 
 
 181. See Crawford v. Washington, 54 P.3d 656, 663-64 (Wash. 2002), rev’d, Crawford, 541 
U.S. 36 (The Washington Supreme Court opined: “ ‘[W]hen a codefendant’s confession is virtually 
identical [to, i.e., interlocks with] that of a defendant, it may be deemed reliable.’ “ (quoting State v. 
Rice, 844 P.2d 416, 427 (Wash. 1993)). 
 182. The Crawford Court declined to take the opportunity to provide a comprehensive 
definition of the term “testimonial.”  See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53, 68, n.4, & n.10, but it noted that, 
“at a minimum,” the term encompassed “prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand 
jury, or at least a former trial; and to police interrogations,” id. at 68, as well as “statements taken by 
police officers,” id. at 52.  But cf. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 823-30 (2006) (further 
refining the definition of “testimonial” and concluding that statements made in the context of an 
ongoing emergency are non-testimonial).  The Crawford Court did, however, provide a general, 
analogically based framework with which to analyze whether statements—oral or written, sworn or 
unsworn—should be construed as testimonial:  
Various formulations of t[he] core class of “testimonial” statements exist: “ex parte in-
court testimony or its functional equivalent—that is, material such as affidavits, custodial 
examinations, prior testimony that the defendant was unable to cross-examine, or similar 
pretrial statements that declarants would reasonably expect to be used prosecutorially,” 
“extrajudicial statements . . . contained in formalized testimonial materials, such as 
affidavits, depositions, prior testimony, or confessions,” . . . “statements that were made 
under circumstances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that 
the statement would be available for use at a later trial . . . .” 
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52. 
 183. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. 
 184. See id. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the 
Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does 
Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause 
scrutiny altogether.”). 
 185. See id. at 61-63. 
 186. Id. at 63. 
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witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to 
cross-examine him or her: 
Where testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the 
Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment’s protection to the 
vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 
“reliability.” . . . Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is 
fundamentally at odds with the right of confrontation.  To be sure, the 
Clause’s ultimate goal is to ensure reliability of evidence, but it is a 
procedural rather than a substantive guarantee.  It commands not that 
evidence be reliable but rather that reliability be assessed in a 
particular manner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination.187   
In light of Crawford, then, to comply with the evidentiary strictures 
prescribed by the Confrontation Clause, absent meeting a two-part, 
conjunctive test—a showing of both witness unavailability and the 
defendant having had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness—
testimonial statements may only be adduced in a certain form: live, in-
court testimony by the declarant, subject to cross-examination.188  
Therefore, the Crawford decision necessarily changed the constitutional 
analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), because the gatekeeping function of the 
trial judge as to the reliability of out-of-court statements (which had 
been invoked to allow the statute to survive both pre- and post-Ring 
facial challenges) was no longer recognized as a constitutional judicial 
practice, at least insofar as it collided with and impinged upon criminal 
defendants’ procedurally grounded Sixth Amendment right of 
confrontation. 
The Supreme Court recently made it clear a fortiori that the right of 
confrontation recognizes no exceptions based on the perceived reliability 
 
 187. Id. at 61.  See Robert P. Mosteller, Remaking Confrontation Clause and Hearsay Doctrine 
Under the Challenge of Sexual Abuse Prosecutions, 1993 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 754 (1993) (“The 
right[s] articulated in the Sixth Amendment generally, and the confrontation right specifically, are 
not meant to make trustworthiness the defining principle.  Rather, the central principle is that the 
Framers chose an adversarial system . . . .”).  As Justice Scalia elucidates, “the [Confrontation] 
Clause . . . reflects a judgment, not only about the desirability of reliable evidence . . . but about how 
reliability can best be determined.” Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61 (citation omitted).  He illustrates his 
point analogically: “Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to 
dispensing with jury trial because the defendant is obviously guilty.  This is not what the Sixth 
Amendment prescribes.”  Id. at 62. 
 188. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69 (“Where testimonial evidence is at issue . . . the Sixth 
Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination . . . the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is 
the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.).  But cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 
836, 853 (1990) (noting that the Sixth Amendment right of literal, face-to-face confrontation is not 
absolute, and in some circumstances, may be outweighed by sufficiently compelling interests). 
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of certain types of testimionial statements to its absolute bar on the use 
of testimonial hearsay in criminal prosecutions.  The Court’s decision in 
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, decided in June, 2009, is significant 
because it is indicative of the extent to which the procedurally based 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation is not subject to utilitarian 
calculus or judicial fiat, and it reinforces the conclusion that that right is 
not susceptible to abrogation by the legislature or the courts for any 
reason.189  In Melendez-Diaz, the Court echoed Crawford’s teaching that 
the Confrontation Clause provides a “procedural rather than a 
substantive guarantee,” explaining that “[d]ispensing with confrontation 
because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury 
trial because a defendant is obviously guilty.”190  
In expounding on the definition of “testimonial” and holding that 
Crawford’s mandate applies to certificates authenticating forensic or lab 
reports prepared for use at trial, the Melendez-Diaz Court implied that 
practical considerations in no way affect the scope or substance of the 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation: 
Respondent and the dissent may be right that there are other ways—
and in some cases better ways—to challenge or verify the results of a 
forensic test. But the Constitution guarantees one way: confrontation. 
We do not have license to suspend the Confrontation Clause when a 
preferable trial strategy is available.191 
 
 189. 129 S. Ct. 2527, 174 L.Ed.2d 314 (2009).  Indeed, the Court summarily dispensed with 
the state’s utilitarian argument against extending Crawford’s holding to include scientific reports 
prepared for use in criminal trials: 
[R]espondent asks us to relax the requirements of the Confrontation Clause to 
accommodate the “necessities of trial and the adversary process.” . . . . It is not clear 
whence we would derive the authority to do so.  The Confrontation Clause may make the 
prosecution of criminals more burdensome, but that is equally true of the right to trial by 
jury and the privilege against self-incrimination. The Confrontation Clause—like those 
other constitutional provisions—is binding, and we may not disregard it at our 
convenience. 
Id. at 2540. 
 190. Id. at 2536 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61-62).  As the dissent implicitly recognized, 
the Melendez-Diaz majority eschewed a cost-benefit analysis in favor of a principled application of 
the principles announced in Crawford:  
For the sake of . . . negligible benefits, the Court threatens to disrupt forensic 
investigations across the country and to put prosecutions nationwide at risk of dismissal 
based on erratic, all-too-frequent instances when a particular laboratory technician, now 
invested by the Court’s new constitutional designation as the analyst, simply does not or 
cannot appear. 
Id. at 2549 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 191. Id. at 2536.  Conversely, the dissent emphasized the practical consequences of the 
majority’s holding, characterizing it as “driven by nothing more than a wooden application of the 
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The Court’s reasoning in Melendez-Diaz is instructive insofar as it 
illustrates the unequivocal, absolute, and unyielding character of the 
right of confrontation that the Sixth Amendment affords criminal 
defendants.  In other words, where the right of confrontation applies, 
pragmatic considerations or judicial assessments of reliability are 
inapposite; its categorical proscription against the admission of 
testimonial hearsay recognizes no exceptions. 
VI. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(C) POST-CRAWFORD 
The effect of Crawford’s holding on 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)’s 
constitutionality is twofold.  First, as mentioned above, in removing 
from the purview of judicial discretion the authority to make reliability-
based determinations concerning the admissibility of testimonial out-of-
court statements, it moots a response to a post-Ring challenge of the 
statute.  Namely, that notwithstanding the right of confrontation, the 
Roberts decision effectively ensured that the statute is not facially 
unconstitutional by enabling the courts to decide on the admissibility of 
statements based on their perceived reliability.  Second, it precisely 
defines the parameters of the right of confrontation.  Both effects are 
resounding, insofar as they are applicable. 
Logic dictates that Crawford’s mandate should apply to the 
eligibility determination phase of federal capital trials.192  As discussed, 
it is during this phase that the prosecution must prove two statutorily 
defined elements in order for a capital defendant to be exposed to the 
possibility of a death sentence.193  Consistent with Apprendi and Ring, 
when a fact must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order to 
enhance the exposure of a defendant, or capital defendant, an additional 
element has been added to the original offense, thereby creating a new 
offense.194  As the narrower Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial 
 
Crawford and Davis definition of ‘testimonial,’ “ id. at 2547 (Kennedy, J., dissenting), and arguing 
that the majority’s “ruling has vast potential to disrupt criminal procedures.” Id. at 2545 (Kennedy, 
J., dissenting). 
 192. See United States v. Sablan, No. 00-00531, 2008 WL 700172, at *3, 75 Fed. R. Evid. 
Serv. 1187 (D. Colo. 2008) (“[I]t appears undisputed that Crawford applies to the eligibility phase 
of the penalty stage, where the statutory aggravating factors must be found that make the defendant 
eligible for death.”).  See also United States v. Brown, 441 F.3d 1330, 361 n.12 (11th Cir. 2006) 
(“District courts . . . have held that the Confrontation Clause and Crawford apply in the “eligibility” 
portion of the penalty phase (where the jury determines whether the defendant is statutorily eligible 
for the death penalty) but not in the “selection” portion of the penalty phase (where the jury 
determines whether it will actually impose the death penalty.”) (citations omitted)). 
 193. See supra notes 88-95 and accompanying text. 
 194. See supra notes 122-140 and accompanying text. 
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applies, so must the broader Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.195  
The application of the Confrontation Clause should not vary depending 
on which element the government is seeking to prove. 
Indeed, it is evident that an intellectually honest assessment would 
render the conclusion that the Confrontation Clause does, in fact, apply 
to eligibility determinations.  As such, eligibility determinations 
conducted pursuant to the FDPA per the relaxed evidentiary standard 
delineated by 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)—which provides only for an 
abridged, qualified right of confrontation that may be denied based on 
the whim and caprice of the trial judge196—are irreconcilably 
inconsistent with the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation as defined 
in Crawford.197  As mentioned above, this highlights the importance of 
the Crawford decision on this discussion. 
In affirming the constitutionality of the FDPA, courts have 
reasoned that the “FDPA does not eliminate this function of the judge as 
gatekeeper of constitutionally permissible evidence; nor does it alter or 
‘eliminate the constitutional baseline for the admissibility of evidence in 
a criminal trial.’”198  But as Crawford makes clear, the problem with that 
line of reasoning is self-evident: under the procedural framework that the 
FDPA delineates, the judge, in his or her role as constitutional 
gatekeeper, is entrusted with an impermissible degree of discretion at 
capital sentencing hearings.199  Indeed, the notion that the Confrontation 
Clause does not permit judges to make determinations that testimonial 
evidence is reliable but rather prescribes a particular procedure that must 
be used to assess the reliability of testimonial evidence is central to the 
 
 195. See supra note 129 & 140 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra notes 183-189 and accompanying text. 
 198. United States v. Fell, 360 F.3d 135, 145 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting United States v. 
Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 144-45 (N.D.N.Y 2002)).  See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 239 
F. Supp. 2d 924, 946 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (holding that the FDPA “expressly supplants only the rules 
of evidence, not constitutional standards . . . .”); United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 902 
(E.D. Va. 2005); United States v. Fields, 483 F.3d 313, 343 n.27 (5th Cir. 2007) (same) (quoting 
Johnson, 239 F. Supp. 2d at 946).  See also United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 242 (5th Cir. 
1998) (concluding that the evidentiary standard the FDPA prescribes “does not impair the reliability 
or relevance of information at capital sentencing hearings”). 
 199. See supra notes 102-109 and accompanying text.  Cf. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 
36, 67 (2004) (“The Framers . . . knew that judges, like other government officers, could not always 
be trusted to safeguard the rights of the people; the likes of the dread Lord Jeffreys were not yet too 
distant a memory.  They were loath to leave too much discretion in judicial hands.”).  In colonial 
America, as in England, judicial discretion was traditionally circumscribed in capital cases through 
the use of mandatory penalties.  See Douglas, supra note 8, at 2016-18. 
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rationale undergirding the holding in Crawford.200  This should be 
particularly true in capital cases. 
The Supreme Court has long recognized that “[b]ecause of th[e] 
qualitative difference [between receiving a death sentence and life 
imprisonment], there is a corresponding difference in the need for 
reliability” in the penalty phase of capital trials.201  As the Court 
explained in Gregg v. Georgia, in capital cases, “accurate sentencing 
information is an indispensable prerequisite to a reasoned determination 
of whether a defendant shall live or die.”202  In light of these unique 
concerns, the Court has frequently emphasized that “the Constitution 
places special constraints on the procedures used to convict an accused 
of a capital offense and sentence him to death,” because “the finality of 
the death penalty requires a ‘greater degree of reliability.’”203 
Finally, it should be noted that if the Confrontation Clause is at all 
operative in the penalty phase of federal capital trials, under the 
applicable rules of statutory construction,204 it is immaterial whether the 
Confrontation Clause’s application is limited to the eligibility 
determination or applies to both the sentence-selection decision and the 
eligibility determination.  Some commentators have argued that the 
Confrontation Clause applies to the totality of the penalty phase in all—
state and federal—capital trials.205  Indeed, one commentator went so far 
as to advance the idea that the Confrontation Clause applies at all 
sentencing proceedings, capital or otherwise.206  This article, however, 
does not address the merits of those positions.  The narrow question here 
is, as stated, whether, in light of the holding in Crawford, the relaxed 
evidentiary standard 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) explicitly prescribes violates 
the Confrontation Clause.  It is our position that—leaving aside the 
question whether the Sixth Amendment applies during sentence 
selection—even if, arguendo, the Confrontation Clause only applies to 
the eligibility determination under that provision of the FDPA, that 
statute, on its face, is unconstitutional.  Having said that, though, 
 
 200. See supra notes 183-189 and accompanying text. 
 201. Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). 
 202. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 190 (1986).  
 203. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1989) (internal citations omitted).  See also Monge 
v. California, 524 U.S. 721, 732 (1998) (noting the “acute need for reliability in capital sentencing 
proceedings”); Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1994). 
 204. See infra Part VI. 
 205. For thoughtful, insightful arguments advancing that position, see generally Douglas, supra 
note 8; White, supra note 49. 
 206. See Nigel Hugh Holder, Comment, Confrontation at Sentencing: The Logical Connection 
Between Crawford and Blakely, 49 HOW. L.J. 179, 180-83 (2005). 
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evaluating the pragmatic application of the argument is as important as 
the argument itself; and, interestingly, that evaluation leads us into a 
separate constitutional discussion altogether, without which our initial 
argument stands incomplete.   
Again, we posit that 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) is facially unconstitutional 
as it applies to the eligibility determination.  If the Supreme Court were 
to agree, and Congress was then to insert into the statute language 
consistent with the notion that the right of confrontation applies to the 
eligibility determination, how would such a hearing manifest itself in 
light of the unitary nature of the penalty phase in federal capital trials?  
In other words, how would a court reconcile the application of the right 
of confrontation as to eligibility evidence but not as to sentence-selection 
evidence, given that the evidence is being received simultaneously?  
Practicality dictates a utilitarian answer: legislatively mandated 
trifurcation.  The emphasis on the phrase “legislatively mandated” is for 
good reason: It is the only constitutional method of implementing 
trifurcation, given the current language of 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c). 
Arriving at this remedy necessarily calls for a discussion of an 
occasionally applied unconstitutional remedy—what amounts to the 
second of “two wrongs.”  The title of the proceeding section is clear 
enough, although we begin with an overview of trifurcation and its 
application in capital trials. 
VII. JUDICIAL TRIFURCATION IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL  
A.  The Concept of Trifurcation 
To ameliorate perceived constitutional shortcomings in the capital-
sentencing framework prescribed by 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), commentators 
have proposed trifurcating federal capital trials—i.e., during sentencing, 
severing the eligibility determination from the sentence-selection 
decision.207  Indeed, Douglas Houser unequivocally submits “that 
statutory construction of the FDPA itself . . . compels trifurcation.”208  
Simply put, proponents of trifurcation advocate dividing capital trials 
into three separate and distinct hearings: a guilt-innocence phase; an 
eligibility phase; and finally, a sentence-selection phase.209   
 
 207. See, e.g., Houser, supra note 4, at 377-86 (2007); Margo A. Rocklin, Note, Place the 
Death Penalty on a Tripod, or Make It Stand On Its Own Two Feet, 4 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 
788 (2007). 
 208. Houser, supra note 4, at 364. 
 209. See id. at 378-79.  See generally Rocklin, supra note 208. 
40
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss1/1
FINAL PEPSON_SHARIFI_MACRO 1.11.10.DOC 1/25/2010  2:32 PM 
2010] TWO WRONGS DON’T MAKE A RIGHT 41 
Under a so-called trifurcated framework, the Confrontation Clause 
would apply to the guilt-innocence and eligibility determinations but not 
the sentence-selection decision.210  Consequently, during the eligibility 
phase, any testimonial evidence proffered would have to comply with 
the strictures delineated by the Crawford Court; however, neither the 
Confrontation Clause nor the holding in Crawford could be invoked to 
bar the admission of testimonial hearsay during the sentence-selection 
phase.211  Indeed, a few federal district courts have adopted a trifurcated 
framework during federal capital trials in an effort to avoid addressing 
18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)’s constitutional shortcomings, (including 
Johnson,212 Jordan,213 and Bodkins,214 et al.215), reasoning that 
trifurcation is permissible because the statute does not explicitly forbid 
the practice.216 
B.  The Inapplicability of Constitutional Avoidance 
The problem with judicially imposed trifurcation, at least in the 
context of the FDPA, as Alexander Bunin explains, is that judicially 
 
 210. See United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903-04 (E.D. Va. 2005) (splitting 
sentencing phase into eligibility stage and selection stage and applying Confrontation Clause to 
eligibility stage); United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 110-11 (N.D. Iowa 2005) 
(outlining the structure of a trifurcated capital trial).   See generally Houser, supra note 4, at 377-86 
(sketching the procedural distinction between trifurcated and bifurcated capital trials and explaining 
the rationale for adopting a trifurcated framework). 
 211. See, e.g., United States v. Bodkins, No. CRIM.A.4:04CR70083, 2005 WL 1118158, *5 
(W.D. Va. 2005) (noting that “any testimonial hearsay evidence offered during the eligibility phase 
would have to meet the requirements of Crawford before it could be presented to the jury.  Those 
same requirements would not apply to hearsay evidence, testimonial or non-testimonial, offered 
during the selection phase.”). 
 212.  See Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1064-65. 
 213. See Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 903-04 (dividing the “evidentiary and deliberative process 
in the penalty phase of a capital case” into two distinct, compartmentalized inquiries: “eligibility 
and selection”). 
 214. See Bodkins, 2005 WL 1118158 at *4-*5. 
 215. See also United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 936, 957 (S.D. Ohio 2005); United 
States v. Davis, 912 F. Supp. 938, 949 (E.D. La. 1996). 
 216. See, e.g., Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 903 (“A close examination of the governing statute, 
however, reveals that the statute does not necessarily mandate a single unitary proceeding.”); 
Bodkins, 2005 WL 1118158 at *7 (the court elected to divided the penalty phase in the manner 
sketched above—i.e., it required separate, compartmentalized eligibility and sentence-selection 
decisions—reasoning that that was permissible because the FDPA does not “forbid a bifurcated 
sentencing proceeding.”); see also United States v. Perez, No. 3:02CR7, 2004 WL 935260, *2 n.2 
(D. Conn. 2004) (“[T]he evidentiary standard in the FDPA is but one way of achieving compliance 
with constitutional mandates; ultimately the Constitution must govern evidentiary decisions.”); 
Johnson, 378 F. Supp. 2d at 1059-62 (explaining rationale for trifurcation).  But see United States v. 
Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 491 (D. Vt. 2002) (“[c]ourts cannot, and should not, rewrite an 
unambiguous Congressional directive regarding th[e] process” the FDPA delineates). 
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imposed trifurcation is beyond the scope of the proper and properly 
limited role of the judiciary: 
For a court to simply create a new procedure that changes the entire 
dynamic of a capital trial would seem to violate the separation of 
powers between the judicial and legislative branches of government.  
While judges have wide authority to interpret laws, they are not 
entitled to write them.217 
As the Supreme Court explained in Palermo v. United States, even 
its “power . . . to prescribe rules of procedure and evidence for the 
federal courts exists only in the absence of a relevant Act of 
Congress.”218  Put differently, Congress alone has the authority to 
promulgate or revise federal legislation;219 it is not the courts’ 
prerogative to, in essence, rewrite the law. 
To be sure, under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, “where a 
statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and 
doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such 
questions are avoided, [a court’s] duty is to adopt the latter.”220  Because 
it is a canon principle of statutory construction that, “out of respect for 
Congress,” reviewing courts are bound to “assume [that Congress] 
legislates in the light of constitutional limitations . . . .”221  To invoke the 
rule of constitutional avoidance, however, “the statute must be genuinely 
susceptible to two constructions,” for it is “[o]nly then [that] the 
statutory construction that avoids the constitutional question [is] a ‘fair’ 
one.”222  The doctrine of constitutional avoidance has limits; a reviewing 
 
 217. Bunin, supra note 8, at 274-75. 
 218. 360 U.S. 343, 353 n.11 (1959) (emphasis added). 
 219. Bunin, supra note 8, at 275-76 (citing United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. 32, 32-34 (1812) 
(stating that federal criminal law may only be created by statute)). Cf. Jackson, supra note 63, at 91 
(arguing that although Congress has authority to amend the FDPA, “recent failed attempts to abolish 
the Act indicate that any such Congressional action is highly unlikely in the near future.”) (citing 
Federal Death Penalty Act of 2003, H.R. 2574, 108th Cong. (2003)). 
 220. Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 239 (1999) (quoting United States ex rel. Att’y 
General v. Del. & Hudson Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909)).  See also United States v. Jin Fuey Moy, 
241 U. S. 394, 401 (1916) (As Justice Holmes opined: “A statute must be construed, if fairly 
possible, so as to avoid not only the conclusion that it is unconstitutional but also grave doubts upon 
that score.”) (citations omitted). 
 221. Jones, 526 U.S. at 239-40 (quoting Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U. S. 173, 191 (1991)). Cf. Tot v. 
United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943) (although “Congress has power to prescribe what evidence 
is to be received in the courts of the United States,” that power must be exercised concordant with 
the Constitution). 
 222. Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 238 (1998). 
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court “cannot press statutory construction ‘to the point of disingenuous 
evasion’ even to avoid a constitutional question.”223   
Application of the foregoing standard to 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) leads 
us to the conclusion that the provision falls outside of the ambit of the 
rule of constitutional avoidance.  18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), by its terms, 
contemplates a single, unified sentencing hearing.224  In fact, numerous 
courts have recognized that the language of the statute provides for a 
unitary sentencing framework.225  18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) is devoid of 
language that either explicitly mentions or would even implicitly suggest 
a bifurcated sentencing proceeding.  Thus, the language of that provision 
is reasonably susceptible to only one construction:  The FDPA 
contemplates a unitary sentencing proceeding. 
Since the FDPA was enacted in 1994—eight years before Ring was 
decided and ten years prior to Crawford—it is doubtful that Congress 
could have anticipated the manner in which Crawford and Ring would 
fundamentally alter the constitutional requirements during the eligibility 
phase of capital sentencing proceedings.226  The FDPA’s legislative 
history does note that its overarching purpose was “to establish 
Constitutional procedures for the imposition of the Federal death 
penalty.”227  But Congress could not have legislated consistent with—or 
even in anticipation of—constitutional strictures that, except through 
divination, it could not have foreseen.  That proposition holds true 
especially in light of the fact that Congress did, in fact, craft a sentencing 
procedure that, when the FDPA was initially promulgated, was entirely 
 
 223. United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985) (quoting Moore Ice Cream Co. v. Rose, 
289 U. S. 373, 379 (1933) (Cardozo, J.)). 
 224. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b) (2000) (“the judge . . . shall conduct a separate sentencing 
hearing to determine the punishment to be imposed . . . .”) (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) 
(“[a]t the sentencing hearing”) (emphasis added); 18 U.S.C. § 3593(d) (referring to “the hearing”) 
(emphasis added). 
 225. E.g., United States v. Barnette, 390 F.3d 775, 810 (4th Cir. 2004) (“By its terms, the 
Federal Death Penalty Act contemplates only a single sentencing hearing . . . .”); United States v. 
Bodkins, No. CRIM.A.4:04CR70083, 2005 WL 1118158, *7 (W.D. Va. 2005) (explaining that 18 
U.S.C. § 3593(c) “contemplates the possibility of a unitary proceeding”).  See also United States v. 
Concepcion Sablan, 555 F. Supp. 2d 1205, 1222 (D. Colo 2007) (“the FDPA does not in any way 
refer to or authorize bifurcation of the penalty phase”).  See Bunin, supra note 8, at 274 (Alexander 
Bunin submits that given that the FDPA “clearly approves only a very specific bifurcated 
procedure,” judicial trifurcation “requires rewriting the FDPA.”). 
 226. See United States v. Fell, 217 F. Supp. 2d 469, 490 (D. Vt. 2002) (“When Congress 
enacted the FDPA, it could not have anticipated that death-eligibility factors would be regarded as 
the functional equivalent of elements.”); Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 903 (“It is . . . doubtful that 
Congress, in drafting the statute, could have forecast the scope or impact of Crawford on its 
legislation.”).  See also United States v. Mills, 446 F. Supp. 2d 1115, 1131 n.16 (C.D. Cal. 2006) 
(noting that “dividing the penalty phase [is] a procedure not foreseen by the FDPA”). 
 227. H.R. REP. NO. 103-467 (1994). 
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consonant with the Court’s then-prevailing capital-sentencing-rights and 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.228  Thus, it is highly unlikely that 
Congress could have intended to legislate consistent with judicially 
imposed constitutional limitations—here, by providing for bifurcation—
that did not even exist at that time.  If that were the case, Congress 
would have drafted the statute in a manner that explicitly required or at 
least tacitly authorized bifurcated capital sentencing proceedings.  
The notion that 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) reflects a congressional intent 
to grant, carte blanche, the federal courts the authority to devise and 
implement any capital sentencing procedure that they deem fit so long as 
it was not explicitly prohibited by that statute is, to say the least, highly 
problematic.  Indeed, reducio ad absurdam, acceptance of that 
proposition—i.e., if judges are not statutorily prohibited from taking a 
given action, then that action must be within the scope of their 
discretion—would lead to patently untenable consequences.  The plain 
language of a statute places some constraints on judicial construction; 
and judges do not have the unrestricted authority to interpret statutes 
however they see fit.  The FDPA is no different. 
In Caminetti v. United States, the Court described the so-called 
plain meaning rule this way: 
When the language of a statute is plain and does not lead to absurd or 
impracticable results, there is no occasion or excuse for judicial 
construction; the language must then be accepted by the courts as the 
sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent, and the courts have no 
function but to apply and enforce the statute accordingly.229 
More recently, the Court has explained:   
[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn to one cardinal 
canon before all others. . . .[C]ourts must presume that a legislature 
says in a statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
there.  When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, this first 
canon is also the last: “judicial inquiry is complete.”230   
In other words, unless otherwise defined by statute, courts should 
presume that words are used in accordance with their common meaning 
and should construe them accordingly.231  Likewise, in construing a 
 
 228. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
 229. 242 U.S. 470, 471 (1917). 
 230. Connecticut Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (quoting Rubin v. 
United States, 449 U.S. 424, 430 (1981)). 
 231. Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (“A fundamental canon of statutory construction 
is that, unless otherwise defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, 
44
Akron Law Review, Vol. 43 [2010], Iss. 1, Art. 1
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol43/iss1/1
FINAL PEPSON_SHARIFI_MACRO 1.11.10.DOC 1/25/2010  2:32 PM 
2010] TWO WRONGS DON’T MAKE A RIGHT 45 
statute, courts should look to its grammatical construction.232  The 
legislature “is presumed to know the meaning of words and the rules of 
grammar.”233   
Under the doctrine of noscitur a sociis [it is known from its 
associates],234 the meaning of an ambiguous word in a statute may be 
discerned by reference to the meaning of the words surrounding it and 
the context in which it is used, i.e., its meaning may be ascertained by 
looking at the words used in the rest of the statute in context.235  (For 
that matter, legislative intent may be gleaned in the same manner.)236 
18 U.S.C. § 3593 is entitled, “Special hearing to determine whether 
a sentence of death is justified”; it only refers to “a hearing,” “a separate 
sentencing hearing,” and “the hearing.”237  18 U.S.C. § 3591 of the 
FDPA, likewise, refers to the penalty phase conducted pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3593 as “a hearing”—not once, but twice.238  Concordantly, 18 
 
common meaning.”) (citations omitted); Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 242 (1993) (Scalia, J. 
dissenting) (“In the search for statutory meaning, we give nontechnical words and phrases their 
ordinary meaning.”); Muller v. BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc., 923 P.2d 783, 788 (Alaska 1996) (“In 
assessing statutory language, ‘unless words have acquired a peculiar meaning, by virtue of statutory 
definition or judicial construction, they are to be construed in accordance with their common 
usage.’”) (quoting Tesoro Alaska Petroleum Co v. State, 746 P.2d 896, 905 (1987). 
 232. See United States v. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1897) (“The primary and general 
rule of statutory construction is that the intent of the lawmaker is to be found in the language that he 
has used . . . The courts have no function of legislation, and simply seek to ascertain the will of the 
legislator.”).  See also United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises, Inc., 489 U.S. 235, 241-42 (1989) (the 
Court noted that its reading of the statute was, inter alia, “mandated by the grammatical structure of 
the statute”). 
 233. Goldenberg, 168 U.S. at 102-03. 
 234.  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 956 (5th ed. 1979) (“The meaning of a word is or may be 
known from the accompanying words.”). 
 235. See United States v. LaBrecque, 419 F. Supp. 430, 434 (D.N.J. 1976) (“The maxim 
noscitur a sociis is employed to ascertain the meaning of an ambiguous or doubtful word . . . by 
reference to other words with which it is associated . . . .”).  See also Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 
367 U. S. 303, 307 (1961) (“The maxim noscitur a sociis, that a word is known by the company it 
keeps, while not an inescapable rule, is often wisely applied where a word is capable of many 
meanings in order to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the Acts of Congress.”); Wong Kam 
Wo v. Dulles, 236 F.2d 622, 626 (9th Cir. 1956). 
 236. See Neal v. Clark, 95 U.S. 704, 709 (1877) (“In the construction of statutes . . . the rule 
noscitur a sociis is very frequently applied; the meaning of a word, and, consequently the intention 
of the legislature being ascertained by reference to the context, and by considering whether the word 
in question and the surrounding words are, in fact, ejusdem generis, and referable to the same 
subject-matter.” (quoting BROOM’S LEGAL MAXIMS, 455)). 
 237. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593 (2000).  See also Neal, 95 U.S. at 709 (“[W]here the meaning of any 
particular word is doubtful or obscure, . . . the intention of the party who has made use of it may 
frequently be ascertained and carried unto effect by looking at the adjoining words.” (quoting 
BROOM’S LEGAL MAXIMS, 450)). 
 238. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591. Likewise, under the in pari materia canon of statutory construction, 
the meaning of an ambiguous term or phrase in a statute may be determined by reference to other 
statutes concerning the same subject matter.  See Erlenbaugh v. United States, 409 U.S. 239, 243-
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U.S.C. § 3595 refers to “the sentencing hearing.”239  An analysis of the 
totality of the FDPA thus reflects an unmistakable legislative intent to 
create a unitary sentencing proceeding. 
To be sure, “in the exercise of supervisory powers, federal courts 
may, within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required 
by the Constitution or the Congress.”240  But as the Supreme Court 
explained in United States v. Jackson,  
It is one thing to fill a minor gap in a statute to extrapolate from its 
general design details that were inadvertently omitted.  It is quite 
another thing to create from whole cloth a complex and completely 
novel procedure and to thrust it upon unwilling defendants for the sole 
purpose of rescuing a statute from a charge of unconstitutionality.241 
For that matter, the notion that the judiciary lacks the “discretionary 
power to disregard the considered limitations of the law it is charged 
with enforcing” is a fundamental precept of our system of checks and 
balances.242  In short, however well intentioned and well reasoned a 
response to the FDPA’s constitutional deficiencies judicially imposed 
trifurcation may be, it is outside of the purview of judicial discretion.243   
It is not the province of the courts to salvage an otherwise 
unconstitutional statute through judicial fiat—implementing a procedure 
that the plain language of the statute unequivocally rejects,244 by reading 
it in a manner that Congress almost certainly could not have intended.  
Irrespective of the rebuttable presumption that Congress legislates 
consistent with the Constitution, federal courts cannot, ipse dixit, impute 
a congressional intent to allow for the possibility of trifurcation to statute 
that, by its terms, contemplates a unitary sentencing proceeding.245  
Rather, the onus is on Congress to cure 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c)’s 
constitutional deficiencies through promulgating legislation that reflects 
 
244 (1972) (characterizing “[t]he rule of in paria materia” as “but a logical extension of the 
principle that individual sections of a single statute should be construed together”).  See also 
Wachovia Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303, 316 (2006). 
 239. See 18 U.S.C. § 3595. 
 240. United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 241. 390 U.S. 570, 580 (1968). 
 242. United States v. Payner, 447 U. S. 727, 737 (1980). 
 243. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985) (“Even a sensible and efficient use of [judicial] 
supervisory power . . . is invalid if it conflicts with constitutional or statutory provisions.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 244. Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 426 (1996) (federal courts lack the inherent 
authority to fashion rules and procedures that circumvent or conflict with the Constitution or 
legislation). 
 245.  See supra notes 84 & 225-226 and accompanying text. 
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contemporary Sixth Amendment jurisprudence—by amending the 
statute, thus codifying a trifurcated framework. 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
The application of the statute at issue has created the reality that 
drives the need for this discussion.  It expressly delineates an 
unconstitutionally lax evidentiary standard that creates the possibility 
that a capital defendant may become eligible for the death penalty based 
on testimonial statements provided by an out-of-court declarant; that is, 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), the government may establish facts 
necessary to prove the greater crime of federal capital murder with 
uncross-examined testimonial hearsay.246  Because that provision, by its 
terms, enables the trial judge, at his or her discretion, to admit any 
evidence—including testimonial hearsay—relevant to establishing an 
aggravating factor, so long as the government has provided adequate 
notice to the defendant that it intends to prove that aggravating factor.247   
18 U.S.C. § 3593(c), therefore, deprives capital defendants of an 
unabridged Sixth Amendment right of confrontation, as defined by 
Crawford, by allowing for the admission of almost any type of hearsay 
statement (irrespective of whether that statement is testimonial) during 
the sentencing hearing, in which the eligibility phase is housed.  But if 
the eligibility phase of a capital trial conducted under the FDPA is, as we 
argue, within the ambit of the Confrontation Clause, it necessarily 
follows that federal capital defendants must be afforded a full-fledged 
Sixth Amendment right of confrontation during that stage of their 
prosecution.  It stands to reason, then, that a statute that explicitly 
affords a judge untrammeled discretion to violate a capital defendant’s 
right of confrontation so long as he or she deems the testimonial hearsay 
at issue sufficiently reliable, and therefore allows a judge to deny a 
capital defendant a fundamental constitutional right, is constitutionally 
infirm. 
While the evidentiary standard prescribed by 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) 
may have been constitutional when that statute was initially 
promulgated, because of the jurisprudential sea change created by Ring 
v. Arizona and Crawford v. Washington, that proposition is no longer 
true.  Ring created a constitutional mandate, and Crawford crafted 
guiding principles, with respect to the Sixth Amendment right of 
 
 246. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(c). 
 247. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3593(c) (2000).  See also United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 240 n.5 
(5th Cir. 1998). 
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confrontation, by which that mandate must be applied.  Because 18 
U.S.C. § 3593(c) is within the scope of Ring’s constitutional mandate, it 
must comply with the constitutional requirements outlined in Crawford.  
On its face, the lax, all-too-malleable evidentiary standard 18 U.S.C. § 
3593(c) delineates is irreconcilably inconsistent with Crawford’s 
guiding principles but also its specific holding.  After Crawford, the 
concept of admitting out-of-court statements based on a judicial 
determination of reliability is no longer constitutional, and, therefore, 
allowing the government to prove statutory aggravating factors—at least 
the functional equivalent of elements of federal capital murder—with 
testimonial hearsay, even where the defendant has never had an 
opportunity to cross-examine the declarant(s), is not constitutional 
either. 
Notwithstanding the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, judicial 
trifurcation is an untenable response to the foregoing constitutional 
quandary, which is, in and of itself, unconstitutional.  The notion that an 
unconstitutional evidentiary standard can somehow be cured or 
cancelled out by an equally unconstitutional judicial response is no less a 
logical fallacy than the notion that two wrongs make a right.  We submit 
that although there may be other ways in which the inherent structural 
problems caused by the FDPA’s procedural framework could be 
remedied,248 legislatively mandated trifurcation would best alleviate the 
aforementioned constitutional deficiencies.   
As Alexander Bunin points out,249 legislatures could always heed 
Justice Scalia’s counsel, tacitly offered in his concurring opinion in 
Ring, and “plac[e] the aggravating-factor determination (where it 
logically belongs anyway) in the guilt phase.”250  Indeed, Bunin’s 
proposal for alleviating constitutional concerns with the evidentiary 
standards governing capital sentencing proceedings—to wit, revising 
capital murder statutes, adding additional death-eligibility elements, and 
litigating a capital defendant’s death eligibility in the guilt-innocence 
phase of his or her trial251—makes an eminent amount of sense with 
regard to state capital statutes with an analogous procedural framework.   
 
 248. For example, Alexander Bunin submits that “[t]he only solution [to this dilemma] is for 
legislatures to rewrite those capital statutes to require that all elements of a capital crime be proven 
during the guilt phase of trial.”  Bunin, supra note 8, at 280. 
 249. Id. at 272. 
 250. Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 613 (2002) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 251. Bunin, supra note 8, at 280. 
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But given that the FDPA, in essence, is a sentencing statute,252 
which, inter alia, modified the penalty schemes for existing federal 
criminal statutes, revising the FDPA to provide for litigating a capital 
defendant’s death eligibility during the guilt-innocence phase of his or 
her trial is neither pragmatic nor even feasible.  The FDPA does not 
simply create federal capital crimes but rather expands the number of 
federal crimes for which the government may seek death sentences and 
prescribes the procedures that govern federal capital sentencing 
proceedings.253  To implement Bunin’s proposal in the context of the 
FDPA, then, would thereby necessitate revising literally dozens of 
federal statutes to reflect the dictates of contemporary Sixth Amendment 
jurisprudence. 
Realistically, that leaves Congress with only two constitutional 
alternatives: either scrap the FDPA in toto or revise it in a manner such 
as to not only authorize but require trifurcation, thereby affording capital 
defendants, at minimum, an unabridged right of confrontation through 
the death-eligibility determination.  As noted supra, the ambit of capital 
defendants’ rights at sentencing is beyond the scope of this article, as is a 
discussion of other potential constitutional concerns with the FDPA’s 
procedural framework.  For that matter, we do not herein express a view 
as to which of those two choices is preferable; rather, the purpose of this 
article is strictly limited to highlighting what we believe to be an 
unconstitutional evidentiary practice and an equally unconstitutional 
judicial response.  That being said, assuming arguendo that the FDPA’s 
constitutional shortcomings may be cured through statutorily affording 
capital defendants an unfettered Sixth Amendment right of confrontation 
through the death-eligibility determination, we submit that revising 18 
U.S.C. § 3593(c) to provide for mandatory bifurcation of the penalty 
phase of federal capital trials (i.e., trifurcation) is the only viable method 
of curing those deficiencies short of repealing the statute. 
 
 252. See supra notes 73-79 and accompanying text. 
 253. See supra note 75. 
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